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Presidential Politics and Judicial Review
David E. Adelman* & Robert L. Glicksman** 
Abstract 
This Article assesses the impact of judicial review on one of the nation’s foundational 
environmental statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Based on litigation 
spanning fifteen years, we find that the stringency of judicial review is driven by the interaction 
of judicial ideology and presidential politics. Our principal findings are two-fold: First, judicial 
ideology, here defined by political party affiliation, is most influential when NEPA’s 
environmental goals conflict with the politics of the presidential administration in power. 
Second, the influence of judicial ideology is mediated by the distribution of cases across federal 
circuits and the ideological balance of judges within them; specifically, the concentration of 
NEPA cases in the Ninth Circuit, where liberal appellate judges are in the majority. Under well-
defined conditions, we find that judicial review is most demanding when the risk of statutory 
subversion is greatest—that is, when the politics of an administration conflict with the purpose of 
the governing statute. 
The normative and practical implications of these observations are illustrated by 
comparing NEPA with the expanding array of legal mandates that prescribe elaborate economic 
cost-benefit analyses. Most recently, the Trump Administration has issued a raft of executive 
orders and Congress is considering new legislation that augment the economic reviews required 
under existing laws and regulations. Understanding the interplay between presidential politics 
and judicial review provides new grounds for concern that, unlike NEPA, the pending statutes 
will seriously disrupt and delay agency decision-making processes. Further empirical study of 
judicial review under a range of statutes is needed to determine how broadly our findings apply 
to judicial review of agency action across the federal government. 
* Harry Reasoner Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas.
** J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington University Law School. 
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The actions of federal agencies are constrained by a mix of substantive and procedural 
laws. Organic statutes specify the factors agencies are required or allowed to consider in making 
decisions; administrative procedures are prescribed by the governing organic statute1 or the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).2  On occasion, Congress has supplemented the factors 
agencies are required to consider and the procedures they must follow in cross-cutting statutes 
applicable to all federal agencies. Concerns about agency bias or indifference towards issues 
outside their areas of expertise have prompted passage of such statutes.3 Numerous presidential 
executive orders beginning in the 1970s have augmented administrative procedures further with 
requirements for a variety of economic cost-benefit analyses.4 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2012) (Clean Air Act). 
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012). 
3 See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (requiring agencies to assess 
the effects of federal regulatory actions on state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector); Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 100 Stat. 847 (1996) (requiring agencies to 
consider the economic impact of their regulations on small businesses). 
4 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (cost-benefit analysis); Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (same).  
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The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) established the legal framework for this 
form of enhanced administrative procedure.5 NEPA procedures forced reluctant agencies to 
consider the adverse environmental effects of their decisions,6 and over time it has attained a 
“quasi-constitutional status as one of the foundational laws of the modern administrative state.”7 
This prominence has made NEPA a lightning rod for criticism that its procedures and associated 
litigation needlessly increase costs and delays in agency programs.8 Yet, within a decade of its 
passage, conservative legislators used NEPA as a template for procedural reforms built around 
regulatory impact reviews.9 More recently, the Trump Administration has embraced this 
approach in a slew of executive orders purportedly designed to reduce the costs of regulation,10 
and Congress is working on parallel legislation that would dramatically expand the requirements 
for regulatory impact reviews and the opportunities to challenge them in court.11 These 
developments make NEPA a uniquely valuable subject for evaluating the impacts of augmented 
administrative procedures and the influence of judicial review.  
This Article presents an empirical study of NEPA litigation during the administrations of 
President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama that refutes the most critical views of 
the law. We find little evidence that litigation under NEPA is out of control or that NEPA 
processes are overly burdensome. To the contrary, environmental reviews and procedures 
                                                 
5 DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 13:1 (2016 ed.) (describing how “[e]nvironmental 
assessment is an American innovation that has spread worldwide); see also Mathew Cashmore et al., The Role and 
Functioning of Environment Assessment: Theoretical Reflections Upon an Empirical Investigation of Causation, 88 
J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1233, 1233 (2008) (describing NEPA as the model for statutes in more than a hundred countries). 
6 NEPA requires any federal action with a potential to “significantly impact” the environment to be reviewed in an 
environmental impact statement, which must include a detailed assessment of a proposed action’s environmental 
impacts and potential alternatives that could reasonably mitigate them. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
7 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 333-34 (2004) (claiming that the duty to 
prepare an EIS “is as fundamental to contemporary administrative practice as an agency’s duty under the APA to 
provide notice and opportunity for public comment prior to issuing rules”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and 
the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039-40 (1997) (characterizing NEPA and the APA as 
“framework” statutes whose “rather spare” provisions have generated a “common law of administrative procedure”); 
Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010). 
8 See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 5, § 11:2 (referring to those criticizing “the dangers of excessive zeal” in 
NEPA’s enforcement). Others criticized NEPA as too weak, noting the absence of any substantive component to its 
obligations. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973); see also 
Matthew J. Lindstrom & Zachary A. Smith, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL 
MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE, & EXECUTIVE NEGLECT (2002). 
9 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 382 (2d 
ed. 2015); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 130 (2003) (arguing that economic impact analysis laws focus on “the potential deleterious effects of 
[environmental] regulation on economic development and other important considerations”). 
10 E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 
2017) (requiring reduction of costs from existing regulations as a prerequisite to issuance of new regulations); Exec. 
Order No. 13,777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1 2017) (requiring 
evaluation of existing regulations to identify those that eliminate jobs, inhibit job creation, impose costs that exceed 
benefits, or are inconsistent with regulatory reform initiatives); Exec. Order No. 13,789, Identifying and Reducing 
Tax Regulatory Burdens, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017) (requiring review of significant tax regulations that 
impose an undue financial burden on United States taxpayers, add undue complexity to the Federal tax laws, or 
exceed the statutory authority of the Internal Revenue Service). 
11 See, e.g., The Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 951, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b), (f)(1)). 
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conducted under NEPA are typically circumscribed and rarely challenged in court. Roughly 99 
percent of the many thousands of federal actions with potentially significant environmental 
impacts are covered either by categorical exclusions to NEPA procedures or by environmental 
assessments, which are typically much shorter than environmental impact statements (EISs).12 
By contrast, yearly completions of detailed EISs now consistently fall below 200 nationally.13 To 
put this in perspective, on average fewer than 100 NEPA cases are filed in district court annually, 
roughly half of which involve challenges to EISs. A tiny fraction of environmental reviews under 
NEPA therefore either require detailed EISs or are subject to judicial challenges that have the 
potential to cause significant delays in federal programs. 
 Studying litigation under NEPA provides insights into the potential variation in NEPA 
compliance across federal agencies and the impact of judicial review. At minimum, litigation 
highlights the issues and agencies that receive the most public attention, the ways in which 
NEPA procedures tend to fall short, and the procedures that provide stakeholders with effective 
mechanisms for challenging federal action. NEPA litigation, in part because it involves 
challenges that do not arise under an agency’s organic statute, also provides a less deferential 
context for assessing the impacts of judicial review and the influence of judicial ideology on case 
outcomes.14 Further, by extending the study over two presidential administrations with starkly 
different environmental agendas, we are able to evaluate how NEPA litigation and judicial 
review change in response to shifts in executive branch policies. 
 Our data reveal striking disparities in the number of NEPA cases filed against federal 
agencies, the geographic distribution of cases across circuits, and the types of plaintiffs. While 
one would not expect NEPA litigation to be evenly spread across federal agencies given their 
divergent missions, we find that two-thirds of NEPA cases were filed against just five agencies, 
each of which either manages federal lands or has principal authority over protecting natural 
resources.15 Notably absent from this list are agencies that fund or permit major infrastructure, 
such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and agencies with authority over major 
federal facilities, such as the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. The 
geographic distribution of NEPA litigation is also skewed, with roughly 50 percent of the district 
court and circuit cases filed in the Ninth Circuit alone and another 25 percent in the D.C., Sixth, 
and Tenth Circuits.  
 For most agencies in most states, the patterns of litigation suggest that the public 
engagement and oversight required by NEPA are likely to be modest, particularly given that the 
                                                 
12 Federal agencies annually conduct hundreds of EISs, tens of thousands of abbreviated environmental assessments, 
and hundreds of thousands of routine determinations that environmental impacts of a proposed action are 
insignificant. See CEQ, NEPA Litigation, available at https://ceq.doe.gov/ceq-reports/litigation.html.   
13 See infra Part I.A. 
14 See Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of 
Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 361 (1984) (claiming that courts in administrative law cases tend to 
enforce procedural mandates more strongly than substantive requirements); James V. DeLong, New Wine for A New 
Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 417 (1986) (“The courts are most comfortable 
when assessing the procedural regularity of agency action.”). 
15 The five federal agencies are the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service (FWS), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 
Among these agencies, the USFS and BLM accounted for approximately 50 percent of the district court cases. 
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vast majority of environmental reviews under NEPA have a very limited scope. Important 
exceptions can of course arise—the Keystone and Dakota Access pipelines come to mind—but it 
would be a mistake to infer that these cases are in any way representative of NEPA processes 
generally. In part due to the paucity of data, we worry that this is precisely what NEPA’s critics 
are doing—generalizing from a few high-profile, unrepresentative cases. While litigation data 
are also selective,16 they have at least two virtues—they highlight federal actions of significant 
importance to stakeholders and recurring legal claims. Thus, while our litigation data are not 
representative of “typical” NEPA processes, they provide insights into the contexts in which 
NEPA procedures have heightened importance and the federal agencies likely to be most 
impacted by them. 
 Our most far-reaching results expose the influence of judicial ideology and presidential 
politics on judicial review. In district courts, plaintiffs were 2.8 times more likely to prevail 
during the Bush Administration than during the Obama Administration, 2.5 times more likely to 
prevail in the Ninth Circuit than other circuits, and almost twice as likely to prevail before a 
district judge appointed by a Democratic president as one appointed by a Republican.17 At the 
appellate level, plaintiffs were about 2.3 times more likely to prevail in the Ninth Circuit, but the 
influence of presidential politics and judicial ideology were not statistically significant factors in 
case outcomes. One reason for this result was that the absolute differences in case outcomes 
associated with judicial ideology were much smaller during the Obama Administration. For 
example, in appellate cases plaintiffs prevailed at much higher rates before Democratic-majority 
than Republican-majority panels during the Bush Administration (38 versus 17 percent, 
respectively), but this disparity essentially disappeared during the Obama Administration.  
These results reveal that tensions between the environmental mandate of NEPA and 
conservative presidential politics exacerbated the influence of ideological differences between 
Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges. We identify a novel explanation for this 
phenomenon: During a Republican administration, Republican judges will be sympathetic to the 
Administration and unsympathetic to the liberal goals of NEPA (both factors aligning against 
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges will be sympathetic to the goals of NEPA 
but unsympathetic to the Administration (both factors aligning in favor of environmental 
plaintiffs).  By contrast under a Democratic administration, Republican judges will be 
unsympathetic to NEPA’s goals and to the Administration (both factors essentially neutral 
towards environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges will be sympathetic to both (one 
factor favoring and the other working against environmental plaintiffs). In short, the political 
ideology of judges has the greatest influence on judicial review when the goals of the governing 
statute under review are at odds with the politics of the presidential administration in power. 
These results broaden the range of factors that influence the outcome of judicial review. 
While excellent studies exist on the influence of judicial ideology, including the more complex 
dynamics of three-judge appellate panels,18 to our knowledge no studies have evaluated it across 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1984). 
17 These results are based on a logistic regressions discussed in detail below. See infra Part II.B. 
18 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 
1721 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary 
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presidential administrations with widely divergent policies. Similarly, until very recently, no 
studies have systematically evaluated the variation in judicial review across circuits.19 This study 
provides two principal insights: First, for issues like the environment that are ideologically 
Democratic, we find that the influence of judicial ideology is greater during Republican than 
Democratic administrations. However, we expect that this phenomenon is symmetric—for issues 
that are politically conservative, the influence of judicial ideology will be higher during 
Democratic administrations. Second, the alignment or misalignment of presidential politics with 
statutory goals does not determine the political orientation of judicial review; the political 
orientation turns instead on the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in each 
circuit and the distribution of cases across them. 
NEPA litigation provides a model context for evaluating these dynamics due to the 
concentration of cases in a handful of circuits. In particular, the fifty percent of cases filed in the 
Ninth Circuit amplified the influence of its majority of Democratic-appointed appellate judges 
both directly through the large volume of appellate cases and indirectly through their influence 
on district court judges in the Ninth Circuit, who, irrespective of their political affiliation, ruled 
in favor of plaintiffs at much higher rates than district judges in other circuits. These attributes 
expose the ways in which the geography of circuits mediates the influence of judicial ideology 
and the role of courts in checking agency action that is inconsistent with statutory goals. We find 
that the dominant judicial ideology in larger circuits has greater influence nationally because, 
with higher numbers of cases, rudimentary statistics cause them to account for a disproportionate 
share of the politically uniform appellate panels.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the legal framework for environmental 
reviews under NEPA, discusses the limited information that is available on agency compliance 
with NEPA, and examines the existing empirical literature on NEPA litigation. Part II describes 
the details of the empirical studies we conducted, presents the descriptive statistics for the studies 
of district court and appellate cases, and discusses the results of several logistic regressions and 
other statistical analyses of the data. Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications for 
NEPA procedures and policies and the role of judicial ideology in judicial review of agency 
action. The normative and practical implications of our findings are explored by comparing 
NEPA with the expanding array of legal mandates found in recent executive orders and pending 
legislation in Congress that dramatically augment economic impact analyses. Ironically, the 
same political forces seeking to curtail NEPA obligations based on their costs and associated 
delays are simultaneously promoting the expansion of regulatory impact reviews. We show that 
the inflexibility of the proposed reforms in conjunction with the politics of judicial review have a 
much greater potential to increase agency costs and cause serious delays. 
                                                 
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 (2006); Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic 
Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 638 (2013). 
19 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in The Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(evaluating the application of the Chevron doctrine in roughly 1600 cases issued from 2003 through 2013). 
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I. The NEPA Framework in Practice 
The emergence of the modern era of environmental law is commonly associated with 
President Nixon’s nationally televised signing of NEPA into law on January 1, 1970.20 In part 
because of its groundbreaking beginning, NEPA is often referred to as the Magna Carta of 
Environmental Law;21 it set the stage for a period of unparalleled legislative reforms by 
articulating a set of broad goals for environmental policy and establishing a procedural 
framework for rigorous environmental reviews of any federal action with the potential to 
significantly impact the environment.22 
NEPA has had a profound impact on the consciousness of environmental issues within 
the federal government, and its trademark framework for environmental reviews has been widely 
adopted by countries around the world.23 NEPA is also the forerunner of other cross-cutting 
forms of administrative procedure, such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),24 Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA),25 and Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA),26 that augment the 
APA’s basic requirements by requiring agencies engaged in rulemaking to prepare economic-
oriented regulatory impact analyses. Similar to the APA, NEPA is government-wide in scope 
and consequently subjects thousands of federal actions each year to environmental reviews.27 
The strategic value of NEPA to stakeholders who oppose or have concerns about proposed 
federal actions stems from this broad scope, the capacity of NEPA procedures to delay and draw 
public attention to federal actions, and the potential for the information its environmental reviews 
generate to provide grounds for halting or modifying projects that would otherwise pose 
significant threats to human health or the environment. 
In large part because of negative perceptions about aggressive litigation practices, 
fundamental disagreements exist among policymakers and observers about the value of NEPA 
procedures. These conflicting perspectives have been aptly summarized by Michael Blumm, who 
is a prominent academic commentator: 
NEPA seems to be a statute with two lives: part “paper tiger,” part “procedural 
straightjacket”; apparently too vague to give courts authority to reverse agency actions for 
conflicting with its policies, but still capable of inducing court injunctions when agencies 
                                                 
20 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012)). For a 
transcript of Nixon’s remarks, see Remarks on Signing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Jan. 1, 
1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2446. 
21 Shorna R. Broussard & Bianca D. Whitaker, The Magna Carta of Environmental Legislation: A Historical Look 
at 30 Years of NEPA─Forest Service Litigation, 11 FOREST POL. & ECON. 134, 134 (2009); Michael Blumm & 
Marla Nelson, Pluralism and the Environment Revisited: The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 37 
VERMONT L. REV. 5, 5 (2012). 
22 NEPA’s environmental goals were defined broadly to include “promot[ing] efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man” and “attain[ing] the widest 
range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and 
unintended consequences.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331. 
23 See supra note 5. 
24 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2012). 
25 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2012). 
26 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3519 (2012). 
27 See infra Part II.B. 
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fail to satisfy its procedures. This process-laden approach to environmental policymaking 
has both critics and defenders, but both seem to agree that what reviewing courts think 
NEPA requires of agencies is not predictable.28 
 
In essence, the debate over NEPA turns on disparate views about the burdens that its procedures 
impose on federal agencies and the benefits of those procedures derived from better-informed 
agency decision-making. Critics claim that NEPA reviews have ossified into rote processes with 
little added value and that any potential benefits are more than offset by the time delays and costs 
associated with conducting them.29 Supporters counter that most environmental reviews—which 
they claim involve limited procedures and brief assessments—are conducted quickly (a few 
weeks or less) and cheaply. 30 They maintain further that NEPA is essential to ensuring that all 
federal agencies, particularly those inclined to pursue their missions without regard to the health 
or environmental consequences, adequately consider and take into account the potential impacts 
of their actions.31 
Perhaps more than its authors anticipated, NEPA has figured prominently in many of the 
most important environmental disputes and cases over the last forty years. The potential it held 
for strategic delay was exploited within a year of NEPA’s passage when a group of 
environmentalists filed a NEPA suit to enjoin construction of the infamous Tellico Dam, which 
was poised to engulf the Little Tennessee Valley and to destroy one of the last free-flowing 
rivers in the region.32 The NEPA suit ultimately delayed the project and gave the plaintiffs time 
to initiate a second suit under the Endangered Species Act, TVA v. Hill,33 which remains one of 
the seminal cases in environmental law.34 This early victory for environmentalists is just one 
                                                 
28 Blumm & Brown, supra note 21, at 279. 
29 See, e.g., Eugene Burdach & Lucien Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact Statement vs. The Real World, 49 PUB. 
INTEREST 22 (1979) (case study of the Department of the Interior); William W. Hill & Leonard Ortolano, NEPA’s 
Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial Test, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 285 (1978) (NEPA's requirement 
to consider alternatives had only a cosmetic effect on the water resources project of the Soil Conservation Service 
and the Corps of Engineers). 
30 See, e.g., Arthur W. Murray, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist 
Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1972); Sally K. Fairfax, A Disaster in the 
Environmental Movement, 199 SCIENCE 743 (1999); Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The 
Withering Away of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20  J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 
245 (2000); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L. 
681 (1990); Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1998); Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A 
Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990); Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its 
Implementation and Problems, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 293 (2010); John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA, 
and Impact Reduction: An Empirical Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning and NEPA in the 
Mountain West, 46 ENVTL. L. 953 (2016) (study of impact of NEPA on BLM land use planning which concludes 
that NEPA is capable of producing significant reductions in environmental impacts without incurring a 
commensurate economic cost). 
31 Proponents argue that NEPA compels agency managers to “[t]hink more carefully about the environment before 
acting,” focusing their attention on environmental consequences that otherwise might not have come to their 
attention. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s 
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (2002).  
32 MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 324-25 (1987). 
33 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
34 REISNER, supra note 32, at 325-27. 
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example among many that could be cited. NEPA lawsuits have been filed challenging a wide 
range of federal activities, including management of public lands (grazing,35 oil and gas 
development,36 mining,37 and forestry38), funding and permitting of major infrastructure 
(highways,39 power lines,40 pipelines,41 and airports42), remediation and disposal of toxic or 
nuclear waste,43 and operation of major military readiness testing and training exercises, ranges, 
and other programs.44 NEPA procedures and litigation continue to provide important 
opportunities for public engagement and agency oversight throughout the federal government. 
A. Overview of NEPA Procedures 
Congress described NEPA’s mandate as “protect[ing] public health, safety and 
environmental quality by ensuring transparency, accountability and public involvement in 
federal actions and in the use of public funds.”45 Senator Henry Jackson, NEPA’s principal 
drafter, characterized its objectives in similarly expansive terms: 
What is involved [in NEPA] is a declaration that we do not intend as a government or 
as a people to initiate actions which endanger the continued existence or the health of 
mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate actions which do irreparable damage 
to the air, land and water which support life on earth.46 
These ambitions are at odds with the statute’s relative simplicity and the nature of the mandates 
it creates. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, NEPA is an entirely procedural statute.47  
Functionally, NEPA forces agencies to integrate consideration of environmental impacts into 
their decision-making processes (the so-called “stop and think” function) and to disclose the 
results of that analysis to others, including Congress and the public.48 At base, NEPA is premised 
on generating information to enable agencies to identify alternatives to proposed actions that 
                                                 
35 E.g., NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
36 E.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
37 E.g., N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1992). 
38 E.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985). 
39 E.g., Catawaba Riverkeeper Found v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2016). 
40 E.g., Citizens & Landowners Against the Miles City/New Underwood Powerline v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
683 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982). 
41 E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 828 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2016). 
42 E.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
43 E.g., Coal. on West Valley Nuclear Wastes v. Chu, 592 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2009). 
44 E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
45 American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1609(a)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 304. It added 
that NEPA “helps to provide an orderly process for considering federal actions and funding decisions and prevents 
ligation and delay that would otherwise be inevitable and existed prior to the establishment of the National 
Environmental Policy Act.” Id. § 1609(a)(3). 
46 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969). 
47 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980). 
48 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (asserting that NEPA “ensures that 
the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning 
significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the 
larger audience that may also play a role in . . . the decisionmaking process”). 
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would accomplish agency objectives with fewer adverse environmental effects.49 A federal 
agency proposing a “major federal action” must evaluate whether it will have significant effects 
on human health or the environment (broadly construed) and, if so, prepare an EIS analyzing the 
impacts and considering the relative merits of alternative actions.50 In many cases, this initial 
review entails undertaking an abbreviated analysis, referred to as an “environmental assessment” 
(EA), to ascertain whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action have the potential to 
be significant.51 For more routine federal actions, which neither individually nor collectively 
have the potential to be environmentally significant, agencies can designate them under 
“categorical exclusions” (CEs) to be exempt from NEPA procedures. As described below, the 
vast majority of NEPA compliance is covered by CEs and EAs; preparation of EISs is the 
exception rather than the rule.   
 To enable independent oversight of NEPA compliance, Congress established a new 
federal office, the Council on Environmental Quality, that is based in the White House.52 The 
CEQ has issued regulations specifying how agencies must comply with NEPA, such as defining 
the range of  environmental effects that must be considered.53 NEPA procedures have been 
augmented over time through subsequent legislative amendments and regulatory amendments.54 
The Clean Air Act, for example, now requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
review and comment on all EISs.55 The added procedures, EPA reviews, and continuing CEQ 
oversight provide valuable checks on the quality of the environmental reviews agencies conduct 
and the degree of their compliance with NEPA procedures, but the level of scrutiny and support 
for NEPA vary substantially according to the priorities of each presidential administration. 
The primary responsibility for implementing NEPA ultimately rests with the federal 
agencies that are subject to its procedures. Similar to compliance with the APA,56 we expected 
for this reason that compliance with NEPA would vary substantially across federal agencies 
despite the oversight from CEQ and EPA. Absent the threat of litigation, federal agencies 
proposing major actions practically have final say over their compliance with NEPA. 
Recognizing the limits of CEQ and EPA oversight, critics of agency compliance with NEPA 
have charged that “the gap between the purpose and practice of NEPA and the failure of 
environmental agencies to regulate fairly so as to protect public health and the environment has 
                                                 
49 The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which NEPA created, describes the analysis of alternatives (and 
their comparative environmental effects) as “the heart of” an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2016). 
50 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
51 If an agency finds that they are insignificant, it issues a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) and its NEPA 
responsibilities end. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2012) (setting forth the CEQ’s duties and functions). 
53 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). 
54 Congress has also exempted certain agency actions from NEPA or watered down the statute’s procedural 
requirements. See, e.g., Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (codified at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6591 (2012)). 
55 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012). 
56 See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011); Kristin E. 
Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89 
(2011); Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149 (2016). 
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created a dissonance between the law stated and its operation in the real world.”57 In this light, 
litigation is essential to ensuring that federal agencies, especially those with development-
oriented missions, comply fully with NEPA’s procedural mandates. 
B. The Limited Understanding of NEPA Compliance 
Empirical studies of NEPA have provided important insights into the frequency of 
environmental reviews, variation in compliance patterns within and across federal agencies, and 
the nature of litigation under the statute. However, much of this work has focused on relatively 
short periods of time or specific agencies and only one study has examined the influence of 
ideology in judicial review.58 Given the critiques of NEPA procedures as productive of 
unwarranted delays, we will focus initially on the studies of NEPA compliance, which provide a 
broader context for evaluating the impact of litigation, and studies that focus on the distribution 
and frequency of litigation under NEPA.  
A central challenge for empirical studies of NEPA compliance is the paucity of data 
available. Federal agencies typically do not record the number of CEs or EAs they issue, despite 
the fact that most agency compliance with NEPA is covered by them.59 The estimates that do 
exist find that roughly 94 percent of NEPA decisions fall under CEs,60 about 5 percent are 
covered by EAs, and less than 1 percent are reviewed under EISs.61 If one includes draft, 
supplemental, and final NEPA documents government-wide, this estimate translates into the 
preparation of an average of roughly 137,750 CEs, 6,820 EAs, and about 435 EISs annually for 
                                                 
57 James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community Perceptions into 
Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 558 (1994). 
58 JAY E. AUSTIN ET AL., JUDGING NEPA: A “HARD LOOK” AT JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1, 1-2 (2004). 
59 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-14-370, National Environmental Policy Act: Little Information 
Exists on NEPA Analyses 8 (April 2014).  
60 The GAO noted, however, that “[the Department of Energy (DOE)] and the Forest Service officials told us that 
CEs are likely underrepresented in their totals because agency systems do not track certain categories of CEs 
considered ‘routine’ activities, such as emergency preparedness planning.” Id. at 8-9. Under some agency 
regulations, the application of a CE need not be memorialized in a record of decision. 
61 Id. at 8. These are crude estimates and there is clearly variation by agency. The numbers are drawn from 
experience with specific agencies. For example, “[DOE] reported that 95 percent of its 9,060 NEPA analyses from 
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012 were CEs, 2.6 percent were EAs, and 2.4 percent were EISs or supplement 
analyses.” Id. Similarly, the FHWA also reported that approximately 96 percent of highway projects were processed 
as CEs in 2009. Id; cf. Congressional Research Service, The Role of the Environmental Review Process in Federally 
Funded Highway Projects: Background and Issues for Congress 5 (April 11, 2012), 
http://environment.transportation.org/pdf/proj_delivery_stream/crs_report_envrev.pdf (reporting that 96% of 
FHWA-approved projects “involve no significant environmental impacts and, hence, require limited documentation, 
analysis, or review under NEPA). 
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the period 2008 through 2015.62 However, significant inter-agency variability exists.63 For the 
period 2008 through 2015, EPA data reveal that the actual number of EISs issued each year is 
consistent with this estimate, averaging 224 draft and 211 EISs per year, but the number of final 
EISs declined over this period from a high of 277 in 2008 to about 190 by 2014 and 2015.64 
Currently, the number of final EISs issued annually appears to have settled in the range of 185 to 
200.65 
Studies of NEPA processes find that a relatively small number of federal agencies 
account for most of the environmental reviews. According to EPA and CEQ data for the period 
1998 through 2015, four federal agencies issued more than 50 percent of the EISs published 
nationally: on average for this period the USFS accounted for 24 percent, the BLM accounted for 
8 percent, the USACE accounted for 10 percent, and the FHWA accounted for 13 percent.66 The 
EPA data also reveal that 36 other federal agencies issued at least one EIS per year over the 
period 2012 through 2015, with the National Park Service (NPS) and the FWS accounting for 
another 10 percent of the EISs issued, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
rising in prominence starting in 2015 when it began issuing roughly the same number of EISs 
each year as the FWS.67  
Cost and timing data for NEPA analyses are also difficult to obtain.68 In 2003, a NEPA 
task force report “estimated that an EIS typically costs from $250,000 to $2 million, whereas an 
EA typically costs from $5,000 to $200,000.”69 The National Association of Environmental 
Professionals (NAEP) collects data on the time it takes for EISs to be completed. In a report 
covering the time period 2000 through 2012, it found that the average preparation time was 4.6 
years in 2012 and that EIS preparation times had increased on average at a rate of 34 days per 
                                                 
62 GAO, supra note 59, at 9 (the calculation is based on an extrapolation from the percentages for each NEPA 
process using the number of EISs issued by federal agencies in 2011). For further comparison, CEQ was required to 
collect and issue a report on NEPA compliance in 2009. See Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1609(c), 123 Stat. 115, 304 
(2009); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 & NEPA, https://ceq.doe.gov/ceq-
reports/recovery_act_reports.html. For most federal agencies, CEs represented 86 percent of their NEPA 
compliance, while EAs and EISs were prepared for 17 and 3 percent, respectively, of the government actions. Id. 
63 For example, the USFS has reported that 78 percent of the 14,574 NEPA analyses it conducted from 2008 through 
2012 were CEs, 20 percent were EAs, and 2 percent were EISs. GAO, supra note 59, at 9. 
64 EPA data were downloaded from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database for the period January 1, 
2012, through December 31, 2015, which is available at: https://cdxnodengn.epa.gov/cdx-enepa-
public/action/eis/search. These results are roughly consistent with other work finding that EPA reported 253 
(standard deviation of 26) EISs annually during the period 1987 through 2006. Piet deWitt & Carole A. deWitt, How 
Long Does It Take to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 10 ENVTL. PRACTICE 164, 171 (Dec. 2008). 
65 The number of EISs issued annually was derived from the EPA EIS database. Id. 
66 GAO, supra note 59, at 11; EPA data cited in note 62. 
67 The U.S. Navy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Transit Administration, Bureau of Reclamation, 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, and Department of Energy each accounted for between 2 and 3 
percent of the EISs issued from 2012 through 2015 according to the EPA data. EPA data cited in note 62. 
68 GAO, supra note 59, at 12. 
69 Id. at 13-14. DOE collects some of the most detailed information on costs. For the period 2003 through 2012, it 
found that the median cost of an EIS was $1.4 million and the average $6.6 million, with costs ranging from a low of 
$60,000 to a high of $85 million; it also estimated that the median cost of an EA is $65,000, with a range from 
$3,000 to $1.2 million. Id. 
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year.70 In another survey covering 20 years (1987-2006), the average time for agencies to prepare 
an EIS was 3.4 years, with a standard deviation of 2.7 years and a strikingly broad range of 51 
days to 18.4 years.71 This study also found significant differences among federal agencies, with 
the FHWA and USACE having mean preparation times that were 1.9 and 1.26 times longer, 
respectively, than the average for other federal agencies.72 Large differences therefore exist in 
preparation times for EISs both within and among federal agencies.73 
Studies on the benefits of NEPA processes are even more limited and to the extent they 
exist are largely impressionistic. According to a 2015 GAO report, the principal benefits are 
enhanced transparency of agency decision-making, increased public participation, early 
discovery and mitigation of environmental impacts associated with a proposed federal action,74 
improvement of projects based on better or more complete environmental information, and at 
least in some cases time savings from project improvements identified through the NEPA 
process.75 The study found it exceedingly difficult to monetize the benefits of NEPA processes 
due to the non-market nature of the resources and environmental amenities impacted.76 The GAO 
also found it was difficult to allocate the costs of compliance because NEPA procedures overlap 
with those required under other federal laws, presidential executive orders, and state and local 
laws.77 The mix of practical, methodological, and resource constraints highlight the obstacles to 
obtaining direct measures of both the costs and benefits of NEPA procedures. 
C. The Existing Studies of NEPA Litigation 
A relatively small number of government and independent studies exist on NEPA 
litigation.78 Empirical studies of litigation and surveys of agency officials confirm that “most 
NEPA analyses do not result in litigation.”79 According to the CEQ, the number of NEPA cases 
filed in federal district courts was highest in the 1970s, roughly between 150 and 190 cases 
annually, and subsequently dropped to about 100 cases per year in the decades that followed.80 
                                                 
70 NAEP, Annual NEPA Report 2012 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Practice (Apr. 2013), 
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/get-involved/NAEP_2013_NEPA_Annual_Report.pdf. Less information is available on 
EAs. According to a 2013 DOE report, the average completion time for an EA issued by DOE was 13 months; by 
contrast, the average for the USFS was about 19 months in 2012. GAO, supra note 59, at 16. Even less information 
is collected on CEs, but rough estimates exist that range from typical times of 1-2 days within DOE to 177 days 
within the USFS. Id. at 16.  
71 deWitt, supra note 64, at 167. 
72 The average for other federal agencies (excluding the USFS, which was slightly lower) was 2.9 years (standard 
deviation of 2 years), whereas the average for the FHWA was 5.5 years (standard deviation of 3.2 years) and the 
average for USACE was 3.7 years (standard deviation of 2.4 years). Id. 
73 The FHWA is an extreme outlier among federal agencies (completing less than 10 percent of its EISs in two years 
or less), while the USFS managed to prepare more than half of its EISs in two years or less. Id. at 169. 
74 As Professor Karkkainen has explained, NEPA “create[s] powerful incentives for agencies to structure and 
characterize their activities so as to avoid the full NEPA-mandated EIS inquiry,” such as by building mitigation 
features into a project to lower the impacts below the significance threshold that triggers the duty to prepare an EIS. 
Karkkainen, supra note 31, at 920; see also id. at 935-36. 
75 GAO, supra note 59, at 16-17. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 19-20. 
79 Id. at 19. 
80 Id. at 20. 
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Data on circuit cases are more limited, with data from 2012 indicating that 25-30 cases are filed 
each year.81 The CEQ data suggest that about half of the district court cases involved challenges 
to EISs and that from 2008 through 2011 federal defendants prevailed in more than 50 percent of 
them.82 The few studies of circuit court cases indicate that federal defendants prevail at a higher 
rate, with a recent report from NAEP finding that federal agencies prevailed in 86 percent of the 
appellate cases involving NEPA claims in 2012.83 
A handful of independent empirical studies exist that complement the CEQ and NAEP 
reports.84 However, each is limited in one or more of the following respects: (1) the data are 
limited to a narrow time period; (2) the data are highly aggregated; (3) the decisions analyzed are 
associated with a single federal agency or court; or (4) the analysis is limited to descriptive 
statistics. Since 2001, the CEQ has collected some of the most valuable data on NEPA litigation.  
Its annual surveys provide statistics on the number of NEPA cases by federal agency, national 
statistics on the legal bases for each decision, and statistics on the classes of plaintiffs (i.e., public 
interest group, individual, business group, state or local government).85 The CEQ data display 
interesting patterns, particularly variation in litigation success rates over time, but we found the 
coding of the cases to be subject to a number of inconsistencies and inaccuracies. 
Several studies have focused on NEPA litigation against the USFS.86 These studies 
provide valuable insights into litigation patterns over a period of 20-30 years, including changes 
in the geographic distribution of cases, the types of federal actions challenged, the frequency of 
suits by different classes of plaintiffs, the types of claims asserted by plaintiffs, and the success 
rates of specific claims. Other work has focused on the 17 cases decided by the Supreme Court87 
and the influence on judicial review of comments from federal agencies other than the lead 
agency conducting a NEPA analysis.88 All of this work has enhanced understanding of NEPA 
litigation and implementation, but the information it provides remains substantially incomplete.89 
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 21. For example, in 2011 CEQ found that federal defendant prevailed in 68 percent of the cases. Id. 
83 Id. at 22. 
84 Earlier studies include the following: Paul G. Kent & John A. Pendergrass, Has NEPA Become a Dead Issue—
Preliminary Results of a Comprehensive Study of NEPA Litigation,” 5 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 11 (1986) (citing 
statistics showing that most NEPA litigation involves challenges to agency decisions not to prepare an EIS); 
Lucinda Low Swartz, Recent NEPA Cases (2004), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/laws-
regulations/NEPA_Cases_2004_NAEP_paper.pdf (noting that agencies won 60% of cases in 2004 in which there 
was a substantive decision on NEPA issues). 
85 See https://ceq.doe.gov/ceq-reports/litigation.html.  
86 See Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21; Amanda Miner et al., Twenty Years of Forest Service National 
Environmental Policy Act Litigation, 12 ENVTL. PRACTICE 116 (2010). 
87 Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion before and within the Supreme Court: Reflections on NEPA’s Zero 
for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231 (2012). 
88 Blumm & Nelson, supra note 21, at 7 (concluding that “[t]wo decades ago, agency comments explained a high 
percentage of the outcomes of NEPA litigation; twenty-some years later, the correlation between agency comments 
and case outcomes is somewhat less obvious”).  
89 In particular, relatively little information exists about the case outcomes. See, e.g., Jim Vines, Stephanie Salek, & 
Kelsey Desloover, Reforming NEPA Review of Energy Projects, King & Spaulding Energy Newsletter (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/EnergyNewsletter/2012/December/article1.html (finding that an average 
of 24 temporary restraining orders and preliminary and permanent injunctions halting projects were issued each year 
between 2001 and 2009); Congressional Research Service, The National Environmental Policy Act: Streamlining 
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The empirical studies of litigation involving the USFS are the most sophisticated and 
detailed. Several broad patterns emerge from this work. Consistent with other studies, the USFS 
led other federal agencies in the number of EISs prepared each year, averaging 147 draft and 
final EISs annually from 1998 through 2008.90 For federal cases filed against the USFS, the 
available studies indicated that the most common claims involved challenges to either an EA or 
EIS.91 Given that EAs are issued much more frequently than EISs, these statistics imply that 
EISs are challenged at far higher rates than EAs. Geographically, more than half of the cases 
were filed in the Ninth Circuit,92 which reflects at least in part the fact that over 60 percent of 
USFS lands are located in the states encompassed by it.93 In addition, the results were mixed 
with respect to whether plaintiffs prevailed at different rates based on the circuit in which a 
NEPA suit was filed, with conflicting findings about whether the Ninth Circuit favors plaintiffs 
more than other circuits.94  
The studies also find interesting patterns in the outcomes of NEPA litigation. In both 
district and circuit courts, environmental organizations were the most common plaintiffs, 
typically representing 60 to 70 percent of the NEPA cases filed, whereas business interests and 
user groups filed only about 8 percent of the cases.95 Moreover, while the USFS won roughly 60-
                                                 
NEPA 10 (2006), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33267.pdf (noting that in 2004, 
170 NEPA-related case were filed, but only 11 resulted in an injunction). 
90 Miner et al., supra note 85, at 116. 
91 Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 138 (finding that challenges to EAs or EISs accounted for 36 percent of 
the district court cases and 48 percent of the appellate cases; 55 percent of the district court cases and 35 percent of 
the appellate cases involved claims that an EA or EIS should have been prepared); Miner et al, supra note 85, at 
124. 
92 Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 137 (finding that 61% of the cases were filed in the Ninth Circuit, 12% 
in the Tenth Circuit, and 7% in the Eighth Circuit); Miner et al., supra note 85, at 120 (finding that 64% of cases 
were filed in the Ninth Circuit). 
93 Denise M. Keele & Robert W. Malmsheimer, Is the Ninth Circuit a Liberal Environmental Activist Court?, 37 
JUSTICE SYS. J. 115, 118 (2016) (observing that the “Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction over more public lands than any 
other federal circuit”); Robert W. Malmsheimer et al., National Forest Litigation in the US Courts of Appeals, 112 J. 
FORESTRY 20, 21 (2004) (observing that 63% of USFS land is located in the Ninth Circuit); Kirsten Ronholt, Where 
the Wild Things Were: A Chance to Keep Alaska's Challenge of the Roadless Rule Out of the Supreme Court, 29 
ALASKA L. REV. 237, 259 (2012) (reporting that, as of 2001, almost sixty percent of national forest acreage 
(122,092,000 acres) was located in the Ninth Circuit). 
94 Keele & Malmsheimer, supra note 92, at 118 (concluding that “the Ninth Circuit was not significantly more 
activist than other circuits over the time period [1989-2008]”); id. at 131 (concluding that district courts located 
within the Ninth Circuit were statistically significantly more likely to reverse agency action (36.2 percent) than the 
decisions of district courts located within all other circuits (21 percent)); Susan Hair, Judicial Selection and Decision 
Making in the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZONA L. REV. 267, 283-85 (2006) (concluding that while there is evidence that 
individual judges make decision on ideological grounds, the Ninth Circuit as a whole is not more liberal than other 
circuits); Lettie M. Wenner & Lee E. Dutter, Contextual Influence on Court Outcomes, 41 WESTERN POL. Q. 115, 
115-16 (1988) (finding that that the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits were more responsive to 
environmental demands, while the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh were more responsive to industry demands); 
Malmsheimer et al, supra note 95 at 23 (finding that the USFS had the highest likelihood of prevailing in the Tenth 
(67%) and Eighth (71%) Circuits and the lowest in the Ninth Circuit (49%)); Amanda Miner et al., Twenty Years of 
Forest Service Land Management Litigations, 112 J. FORESTRY 32, 35 (2014) (concluding that the USFS was most 
successful in the Seventh Circuit (80%) and the least in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits (48%)). 
95 Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 137 (in a study of 291 district and circuit court cases litigated between 
1970 and 2001, environmental organizations were the plaintiffs in 61 and 66 percent of the district and circuit court 
cases, respectively); Beth Gambino Portuese et al., Litigants’ Characteristics and Outcomes in U.S. Forest Service 
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70 percent of the NEPA cases,96 environmental organizations prevailed at higher rates than other 
plaintiffs.97 Two studies also found mixed evidence that rates at which plaintiffs prevailed varied 
by administration, with an earlier study finding higher success rates during the Reagan 
Administration relative to both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, and a later 
study failing to find statistically significant differences between the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations.98 
One study of NEPA litigation has examined the influence of judicial ideology on case 
outcomes, but it was limited to the first term of the Bush Administration and the analysis 
consisted solely of descriptive statistics.99 It nevertheless found dramatic differences between 
Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in NEPA cases at the district court and appellate 
levels.100 Beyond this work, a large literature exists on the role of judicial ideology in federal 
cases, including a small number of studies that examine environmental cases.101 A ground-
breaking study from the late 1990s examined the impact of judicial ideology on environmental 
cases decided by the D.C. Circuit.102 Consistent with the results in the recent NEPA study, the 
authors found that “ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking” and “that a 
judge’s vote (not just the panel outcome) is greatly affected by the identity [i.e., political 
affiliation] of the other judges sitting on the panel.”103 The central finding of the study was that 
“judges generally vote consistently with their ideological preferences only when they sit with at 
                                                 
Land-Management Cases 1989-2005, 107 J. FORESTRY 16, 18-19 (Jan./Feb. 2009) (finding that of 2,501 parties 
involved in 949 cases from 1989 to 2005, the top twelve parties were all environmental organizations). 
96 Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 137 (finding that the USFS won 60 percent of the district and 57% of the 
circuit court cases); Gambino Portuese, supra note 95, at 19 (finding that the USFS won 70 percent of the cases 
litigated); Miner et al., supra note 85, at 123 (finding that the USFS won 66% of the NEPA cases litigated); Miner et 
al., supra note 93, at 34  (finding that the USFS won 70% of the appeals and 64% cases decided on the merits). 
97 Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 135; Gambino Portuese, supra note 95, at 17 (finding that repeat 
litigants, which were overwhelming environmental organizations, were more likely to prevail in their claims); 
Miner, supra note 95, at 35 (finding that the USFS won only 49 percent of the cases filed by environmental interests 
versus 70 percent of cases involving other plaintiffs). 
98 Malmsheimer et al., supra note 95, at 22 (finding that the USFS won a lower proportion of cases during the 
Reagan Administration (28.6%) than George H.W. Bush Administration (64%) and Clinton Administration (80%)); 
Keele & Malmsheimer, supra note 92, at 126 (finding that the differences in rates at which the USFS prevailed was 
not statistically significant between the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations). 
99 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 1-2 (reporting findings for 325 district court and appellate cases decided during 
the first term of the George W. Bush Administration that substantial differences existed in case outcomes based on 
the party affiliation of the judge(s) hearing the case). 
100 The authors found that Democratic-appointed district judges were twice as likely to rule in favor of 
environmental plaintiffs as Republican-appointed judges (58 versus 28 percent, respectively) and that on appeal 
Democratic-majority panels were six times more likely to rule in favor of environmental plaintiffs as Republican-
majority panels (58 versus 10 percent, respectively). Id. at 8-9. Because the number of appellate cases was modest 
(107 in total) and they were subdivided according to the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges, 
interpretation of the data would have benefitted from a formal statistical analysis of the results.   
101 Revesz, supra note 18, at 1721 (examining 250 environmental cases decided by the D.C. Circuit between 1970 
and 1994); Sunstein et al., supra note 18, at 305; Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy, supra note 
18, at 827; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 
761 (2008); Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit During 2008, 43 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 51, 51 (2009). 
102 Revesz, supra note 101, at 1717-18. 
103 Id. at 1719. 
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least one other judge of the same political party.”104 Given the importance of the effects observed 
in these studies, as well as a large body of work in other areas of law,105 we collected background 
information on federal judges, including the party of the president that nominated each judge.  
 
The existing literature reveals that while thousands of federal actions are potentially 
subject to NEPA procedures, the vast majority are either exempted under CEs or reviewed under 
streamlined EAs. The few available studies also suggest that legal challenges to such abridged 
NEPA procedures are exceedingly rare, particularly relative to the large number of NEPA 
reviews that are conducted annually, but the data are limited in scope and time. The most 
consistent observation is that EISs and NEPA litigation are concentrated in western states and a 
small number of federal agencies. As discussed further below, this geographic bias influences 
inter-circuit differences in judicial review of NEPA compliance, whereas the dominance of a few 
federal agencies drastically limits the impact of NEPA procedures on most federal agencies. 
Questions left unresolved by the existing studies include whether case outcomes differ 
significantly across circuits, administrations, and classes of plaintiffs, as well as the degree to 
which judicial ideology is a consistent factor in determining outcome of judicial review. 
 
II. The Patterns of NEPA Litigation and Factors that Influence Case Outcomes 
 Our studies of district and circuit court cases used both traditional sampling methods and 
automated coding for the entire population of cases in our database: 1,572 district court and 656 
circuit court opinions issued from 2001 through 2015. In addition, we collected data on an initial 
round of 200 cases from a comprehensive list of NEPA cases litigated during the Bush 
Administration and a second sample of about 175 cases filed during the Obama Administration. 
These subsamples included cases that were settled or dismissed prior to a legal ruling on the 
merits and were essential to estimating settlement rates, which differed substantially between the 
two administrations. Most of our analysis, however, centers on the full population study of 
NEPA cases and two samples consisting of 498 district and 334 circuit court cases. The details of 
the empirical methods and protocols are described in the Appendix. 
 The analysis we conducted includes a mix of descriptive statistics (i.e., a breakdown of 
cases by agency, circuit, class of plaintiff, claims raised) and formal statistical methods for 
hypothesis testing. The descriptive statistics provide insights into the broad patterns of NEPA 
litigation and highlight the variation in litigation across agencies, circuits, and administrations. 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that the impact of NEPA as measured by litigation rates is 
skewed towards a small subset of agencies, but the specific claims raised and the rates at which 
plaintiffs prevail were relatively uniform. The variation we observe in case outcomes is 
associated with the presidential administration, the circuit in which a case is filed, and the 
political affiliation of the judge(s) hearing the case.  
 Beyond gaining a broader understanding of the distribution of NEPA litigation and the 
parties filing the cases, we embarked on the project with ten central hypotheses that were 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 
J.L. & POL. 133 (2008); Daniel Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, 
Measurement, and Models, 98 CAL. L. REV. 813 (2010); Michael A. Bailey, Measuring Ideology on the Courts 
(June 2016), http://faculty.georgetown.edu/baileyma/MeasuringIdeology_Jan2016.pdf.  
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motivated by the prior empirical work and our knowledge of NEPA processes and litigation. The 
hypotheses fall into three basic categories: (1) those related to the influence of judicial ideology 
on case outcomes (hypotheses 1-5); (2) those related to external explanatory variables, such as 
agency and circuit (hypotheses 6-9); and (3) those related to the nature of the NEPA claims 
asserted (hypothesis 10). The specific hypotheses were as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: District court judges appointed by Democratic presidents will be more 
likely to rule in favor of environmental, or other similarly situated, plaintiffs than district 
court judges appointed by Republican presidents because of the widespread political 
polarization of environmental issues. 
Hypothesis 2: Appellate panels on which circuit judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents are in the majority will be more likely to rule in favor of environmental, or 
other similarly situated, plaintiffs than appellate panels on which circuit judges 
appointed by Republican presidents are in the majority because of the widespread 
political polarization of environmental issues. As a corollary, appellate panels with all 
Republican or Democratic judges will have the greatest differences in the rates at which 
environmental plaintiffs succeed. 
Hypothesis 3: Judges will be more deferential to administrations in which the president is 
from the same party as the president that appointed them—Republican-appointed judges 
will be more deferential to Republican administrations and Democrat-appointed judges 
will be more deferential to Democratic administrations.  
Hypothesis 4: The influence of judicial ideology in NEPA cases will be greater during 
Republican than Democratic administrations because the ideological commitments of 
judges will align in different ways. During a Republican administration, Democratic 
judges will be ideologically opposed to the administration and sympathetic to NEPA’s 
environmental mandate, whereas Republican judges will be ideologically sympathetic to 
the administration and opposed to NEPA; as a consequence, the potential influence of 
ideology will be magnified. By contrast, during a Democratic administration, Democrat-
appointed judges’ ideological commitments will be split between the administration and 
NEPA’s environmental mandate, whereas Republic-appointed judges will not be 
sympathetic to either; as a consequence, the potential influence of ideology will be 
moderated. 
Hypothesis 5: District court judges will be more willing to rule against federal agencies 
in NEPA actions than in administrative challenges generally because the risk of being 
overturned is very low given that federal agencies so rarely appeal judgments against 
them. 
Hypothesis 6: Plaintiffs will succeed at higher rates during the Bush Administration than 
the Obama Administration in district and appellate court cases because compliance with 
NEPA will, on average, be less rigorous during the Bush Administration. 
Hypothesis 7: Circuits in which a large number of NEPA cases are filed will be less 
deferential to federal agencies because, analogous to a specialized court, familiarity with 
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the legal issues and more extensive circuit precedent will lead to less deferential judicial 
review. 
Hypothesis 8: The rate at which plaintiffs prevail against agencies subject to high rates 
of NEPA litigation will be lower than that for agencies rarely subject to litigation 
because the risk of noncompliance with be greater for these agencies, inducing them to 
heed NEPA’s requirements more conscientiously than if litigation risks were low. 
Hypothesis 9: Environmental plaintiffs are more likely to prevail in NEPA lawsuits than 
other classes of plaintiffs because their interests are closely aligned with the statutory 
mandate and they file the great majority of cases. 
 Hypothesis 10: Consistent with standards for judicial review of administrative 
proceedings, claims that involve technical determinations implicating agency expertise 
will be less likely to succeed than claims involving purely legal or procedural challenges. 
The testing of these hypotheses through a series of logistic regressions was 
complemented by an examination of descriptive statistics that provided an initial gauge of the 
variation in NEPA litigation across the key explanatory variables. Overall, we find solid to 
strong support for hypotheses 1-6 & 9, qualified support for hypothesis 7, and no support for 
hypotheses 8 and 10. These results reveal that while the rates of NEPA litigation vary 
dramatically across agencies, case outcomes are surprisingly uniform despite the heterogeneity 
of agency actions and mandates. The patterns found to be consistent with statistical testing are 
closely associated with the political affiliation of judges, specific circuits, the politics of 
presidential administrations, and the type of plaintiff, but we observe substantial differences 
between the district and circuit court cases that reflect their respective positions in the judicial 
hierarchy and modes of operation. These results suggest that the influence of judicial ideology on 
case outcomes cannot be evaluated in isolation, as it is mediated by presidential politics and 
structural factors, such as the distribution of cases across circuits and the statistics governing the 
ideological balance of three-judge appellate panels. 
A. The Concentration of NEPA Litigation Regionally and Substantively 
We find little evidence that environmental plaintiffs,106 whether national or local 
organizations, are using NEPA for purely strategic reasons to hold up government action. If 
environmental plaintiffs were filing cases purely on strategic grounds, instead of the merits, we 
would expect them to prevail less often than other plaintiffs. Yet, they won substantially more 
often at the district court level than other plaintiffs (35 versus 16 percent, respectively) and on 
appeal (27 versus 14 percent). Environmental organizations also accounted for roughly two-
thirds of the district and circuit court cases, with local environmental groups filing about twice as 
                                                 
106 Plaintiffs were divided into five broad classes: local environmental organizations; national environmental 
organizations; other non-governmental organizations; businesses and business associations; and cities, counties, 
states, and tribes. “National environmental organizations” were defined narrowly to include a small number of high-
profile environmental organizations (e.g., Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife 
Federation, Center for Biological Diversity) to identify the organizations that litigated a large share of NEPA cases. 
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many cases as national environmental groups in our sample.107 By contrast, businesses or 
business associations were plaintiffs in just 7 percent of the district and appellate court cases.108 
In the broader context of judicial review, the success rates of environmental organizations were 
similar to the averages for challenges to agency action in a wide range of empirical studies;109 
moreover, they were substantially higher than the global averages during the Bush 
Administration.110 These findings, along with the roughly proportional share of appeals by 
environmental organizations (i.e., rates comparable to other plaintiffs), provide strong evidence 
that NEPA litigation is grounded on legitimate claims.111 In sum, neither the number of cases 
filed annually nor their outcomes suggests that NEPA litigation is out of step with litigation in 
other areas of administrative law.  
Contrary to our eighth hypothesis, we observe no meaningful differences in case 
outcomes or characteristics across federal agencies despite the enormous range of federal actions 
that NEPA encompasses.112 The only exception is the number of cases filed—consistent with 
earlier studies, a small number of agencies are the subject of most NEPA litigation. However, 
this pattern is partly attributable to the diverse mandates of federal agencies, many of which do 
not involve actions that have significant environmental impacts. To give just one example, the 
FHWA is much more likely through its highway funding programs to trigger a full NEPA review 
                                                 
107 At the district court level, local environmental groups filed 46 percent of the cases in our sample and national 
environmental groups filed 24 percent; at the circuit court level, they filed 40 and 24 percent of the cases, 
respectively. The plaintiffs in a significant number of cases included both local and national environmental 
organizations; these cases were categorized as having been filed by national environmental organizations.  
108 In addition, cities, counties, states, or tribes were plaintiffs in 7 percent of the district court cases and 11 percent 
of the appeals; individuals and non-governmental organizations filed 5 and 11 percent, respectively, of the district 
court cases and accounted for 7 and 11 percent, respectively, of the appeals.  
109 See Richard J. Pierce & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2011) (observing that “[c]ourts at all levels of the federal judiciary 
uphold agency actions in about 70% of cases” irrespective of the standard of review that they apply); Richard J. 
Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 84-85 (2011) 
(synthesizing the results of numerous empirical studies of judicial review and finding that agencies prevail in 64-81 
percent of the cases at the circuit level); Sunstein, supra note 101, at 767-68 (reporting data on administrative review 
cases involving EPA indicating that agencies prevailed on average 72 percent of administrative challenges on 
appeal). A recent study finds that success rates in adjudicated cases in federal courts fell from 70 percent in 1985 to 
33 percent in 2009. Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993423. Thus, plaintiff success rates in NEPA cases are 
similar to the recent figures on success rates in civil cases generally in the federal courts. 
110 The disparity in success rates between environmental and other plaintiffs was far greater during the Bush than the 
Obama Administration. Specifically, during the Bush Administration environmental organizations prevailed in 45 
percent and other plaintiffs in just 20 percent of the cases; during the Obama Administration, they prevailed in 24 
and 13 percent, respectively, of the cases. On appeal during the Bush Administration, environmental organizations 
prevailed in 35 percent of the cases and other plaintiffs prevailed in 16 percent, whereas during the Obama 
Administration, the success rates converged to 17 and 15 percent, respectively. 
111 Litigants motivated by a desire to delay projects may, of course, also have strong substantive grounds under 
NEPA for challenging such projects. 
112 During the Bush Administration, none of the differences was statistically significant or sizeable in absolute 
terms—regardless of how we grouped federal agencies, plaintiffs prevailed roughly 33-42 percent of the time. 
Similarly, under the Obama Administration only the USFS was a potential outlier, but plaintiffs prevailed just 30 
percent more often than other federal agencies collectively (25 versus 19 percent, respectively). In essence, the data 
reveal that plaintiffs’ success rates dropped roughly equivalently across all federal agencies during the Obama 
Administration; this shift simply magnified the somewhat higher success rates against the USFS. 
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than, say, the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The reason for this is obvious—
the scale of highway development and the environmental settings in which projects occur are 
typically of a different order than a housing development in an urban setting. Figure 1 above 
bears out this inference, but the degree to which NEPA litigation targets a handful of federal 
agencies exceeded our expectations.113 About three-quarters of the district and circuit court cases 
involved just five federal agencies, each of which either manages federal lands or has principal 
authority for protecting natural resources.114 Equally striking, just two federal agencies, the 
USFS and BLM, accounted for more than 50 percent of the district court cases. 
Figure 1: Number of NEPA Cases by Federal Defendant 2001-15 
 
While this concentration is driven in part by the large geographic scale and 
environmental sensitivity of the public lands each agency manages, the share of cases filed 
against these agencies nevertheless appears disproportionate. Many federal agencies routinely 
undertake or oversee actions with large environmental impacts and yet are rarely subject to 
lawsuits, notably agencies such as DOE, the Department of Defense, and the FHWA.115 Table 1 
below provides a measure of the observed imbalance by comparing the percentage of the total 
number of EISs issued nationally by prominent agencies against the percentage of the total 
number of NEPA suits with EIS-related claims filed nationally against each of those agencies. 
Table 1 shows that for all but the BLM, the relative litigation rates were much higher for the land 
                                                 
113 The distribution of cases across federal agencies was very similar for the statistical sample of cases we coded by 
hand: USFS – 36 percent; Other Agencies – 28 percent; FWS & NMFS – 15 percent; BLM – 13 percent; and 
USACE – 8.6 percent.  
114 The appellate cases mirror the results for the district court cases, with federal land management and conservation 
agencies dominating appeals. While it is true that appeals from cases involving USACE occurred at higher rates (6 
percent of the district court cases versus 12 percent of the appeals) and appeals against the general class of “other 
federal agencies” occurred at lower rates (28 percent of district cases but just 21 percent of appeals), we believe that 
much of this difference is attributable to the variation in plaintiff success rates. For example, plaintiffs prevailed 
against USACE (17 percent of the cases) at a lower rate than in cases involving all other federal agencies (29 
percent), whereas plaintiffs won 36 percent of the cases involving “other federal agencies.” 
115 Only the FHWA accounted for more than 5 percent of the district court cases filed, and it accounted for just about 
6 percent if cases involving other agencies within DOT are included. 
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management and natural resource conservation agencies, with the NMFS having a litigation rate 
that was five times the share of EISs it issued.  
Table 1: Comparison by Agency of Percent EISs vs. Percent EISs Litigated116 
Agency EPA-EISs Litigation Rates Multiple 
BLM 11.6 11.44 1.0 
DOD 5.4 3 0.6 
DOE 2.7 1.91 0.7 
FERC 3.3 3.54 1.1 
FHWA 8.2 2.18 0.3 
FWS 3.9 7.08 1.8 
NMFS 1.4 7.36 5.3 
Other Agencies 32.1 28.34 0.9 
USACE 9.6 4.36 0.5 
USFS 21.7 30.79 1.4 
 
Accordingly, a central question raised by this and previous studies is why NEPA 
litigation does not reflect the extraordinarily broad scope of the statute, and why it is 
disproportionately used by plaintiffs to challenge decisions involving a handful of federal 
agencies. We suspect that this finding derives from a combination of the exemptions to NEPA 
for a variety of environmental programs, most notably under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act,117 and the limited availability118 or perceived weakness of legal actions under the organic 
statutes that govern public lands management and resource conservation in the U.S.119 Those 
factors may induce litigants to challenge land management agency decisions on NEPA grounds 
instead of or in addition to challenges based on substantive violations of the organic acts.120 
Strategically, plaintiffs may believe that courts will be less reluctant to find procedural violations 
                                                 
116 The EIS data are taken from the EPA EIS database that covers 2012-2016. 
117 See 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (2012) (“No action taken under the Clean Air Act . . .  shall be deemed a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of [NEPA].”); Portland 
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that EPA need not comply with NEPA in 
issuing standards of performance for new stationary sources under the Clean Air Act). 
118 Courts are often unwilling to resolve challenges to programmatic decisions by the land management agencies. 
See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 891 (1990) (alleged land withdrawal review program); see also 
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (holding that court may address allegations that agency 
action was unlawfully withheld in suit brought under § 706(1) of the APA only if the relief sought is an order to take 
discrete action that is legally required); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (challenge to land 
use plan not ripe). 
119 There is a tradition of judicial deference to land management agency decisions, particularly decisions made by 
the USFS and the BLM, which operate under an amorphous multiple use, sustained yield standard. See, e.g., Perkins 
v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975). 
120 The availability of compelling claims under the Clean Water Act’s dredge and fill permit program, 33 U.S.C. § 
1344 (2012), may be an example that at least partially explains why the USACE is a much less frequent defendant in 
NEPA litigation than the USFS. Other agencies, such as the Departments of Defense and Energy, may be sued 
relatively infrequently because of concerns that courts will be reluctant to enjoin activities with national security 
implications, see, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (refusing to enjoin naval training 
exercises), or that, even if environmental plaintiffs prevail in court, Congress may enact appropriations riders 
exempting the agencies from NEPA compliance. 
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of NEPA than to second-guess the agencies on their substantive resource management 
decisions.121 
The focus of NEPA litigation on a small subset of federal agencies is mirrored in the 
geographic distribution of cases across federal circuits. As noted earlier, most federal land is 
located in western states, suggesting that on this basis alone one would expect cases to be filed 
disproportionately in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which together encompass 99 percent of 
BLM land, 85 percent of USFS land, and 91 percent of NPS land.122 We find that two-thirds of 
the district court cases were filed in either the Ninth or Tenth Circuits and that 12 percent were 
filed in the D.C. Circuit (see Figure 2).123 The distribution of appeals across circuits largely 
matches the district court filings, albeit with somewhat higher rates of appeals in the Tenth 
Circuit.124 At the state level, two-thirds of the cases were filed in just 10 states,125 and just four 
states (California, Montana, Oregon, Arizona) and the District of Columbia accounted for half of 
the cases. Only two states of the top 10, Florida and New York, were eastern states and each has 
distinctive characteristics—Florida has many endangered species and wetlands (including the 
Everglades),126 and New York has significant wetlands and very powerful environmental 
interests. The D.C. Circuit is unique for a different reason: plaintiffs can use it as an alternative 
venue to the circuit in which a federal action is located because most federal agencies are based 
in D.C.127  
In the Ninth and D.C. Circuits,128 the concentration of cases may also be influenced by 
forum shopping. As discussed further below, plaintiffs prevailed in district court cases at 
substantially higher rates in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, and on appeal they prevailed at higher 
rates in the Ninth Circuit. While the number of cases and success rates are suggestive, we found 
                                                 
121  We have anecdotal support for this inference based on conversations with Sharon Buccino, who is the Director 
of the Land & Wildlife Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C. It is possible that 
litigants with strong claims under environmental statutes other than NEPA see little downside to adding a NEPA 
claim which they would not have thought worth litigating in isolation. Our data do not allow us to assess whether 
litigants actually pursue this strategy. 
122 The percentages for each circuit are as follows: the Ninth Circuit encompasses 72 percent of BLM land, 64 
percent of USFS land, and 84 percent of NPS land; the Tenth Circuit encompasses 27 percent of BLM land, 22 
percent of USFS land, and 7 percent of NPS land. Congressional Research Service, Federal Land Ownership: 
Overview and Data 9-11, 21 (Mar. 3, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.  
123 The distribution of cases across federal circuits was similar in our sample study: Ninth Circuit – 51 percent, Other 
Circuits – 27 percent, D.C. Circuit – 12 percent; Sixth Circuit -- 3 percent; and the Tenth Circuit -- 7 percent.  
124 The appeal rate in the Tenth Circuit was almost twice that of other circuits, as it accounted for 12 percent of the 
appeals but just 6.7 percent of the district court cases. This cannot be explained by more aggressive litigation on the 
part of environmental plaintiffs, as their rates of litigation do not differ from those in other circuits (64 percent 
nationally versus 67 percent in the Tenth Circuit). Statistically, the small absolute number of appeals in the Tenth 
Circuit, just 39 in total, may foreclose ruling out random variation. 
125 The states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Montana, New York, Oregon, 
and Washington. Only Colorado, Florida, and New York are outside the Ninth or D.C. Circuits. 
126 Florida also ranks 15th nationally with regard to the percentage (13.0) of federal land in the state. See Federal 
Land Ownership: Overview and Data, supra note 122, at 7. 
127 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2012) (providing that a civil action in which a defendant is the United States, a federal 
agency, or an official of such an agency may  be brought in any judicial district in which (a defendant in the action 
resides). 
128 The D.C. Circuit cases involved challenged activities that were located in 11 circuits with the highest number of 
cases originating from the Fourth Circuit (4), Sixth Circuit (4), Tenth Circuit (5), and Eleventh Circuit (3). 
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that less twelve percent of the cases, at either the district court or appellate level, involved federal 
actions that spanned more than one circuit. Thus, while we observe a clear preference for the 
Ninth and D.C. Circuits among the few cases involving government actions that spanned more 
than one circuit,129 the limited numbers neutralize the potential impact of forum shopping. These 
numerical limits do not, however, foreclose the lower success rates of plaintiffs in other federal 
circuits from operating as a deterrent to NEPA challenges. If this were a significant factor, it 
could depress the number of cases outside the Ninth and D.C. Circuits and exacerbate the 
skewed distribution of NEPA cases geographically and by circuit. In either case, the net effect is 
that most of the legal precedent under NEPA has evolved in the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, 
but with the Ninth Circuit clearly the dominant one of the three.130 
Figure 2: Number of NEPA District and Appellate Cases by Circuit 2001-15 
 
The concentration of cases in three circuits has the potential to result in their precedents 
shaping the evolution of legal doctrines under NEPA nationally. One might also expect the 
predominance of certain kinds of agency actions in these circuits to reinforce this effect, as the 
types of claims and facts at issue would frame the context in which legal doctrines are 
developed. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not observe any systemic patterns associated with the 
variation in the frequency of claims brought against specific federal agencies or within certain 
circuits. Moreover, to the extent we do observe significant differences across circuits with regard 
to plaintiffs’ success rates, these differences were not associated with particular legal doctrines or 
claims. 
The absence of variation in the claims raised across agencies and circuits is consistent 
with the lack of variation we observe in the success rates for different NEPA claims. While a 
subset of claims tends to predominate in the district court cases, irrespective of circuit or agency, 
none stands out as favoring or disfavoring plaintiffs. The most common challenges focused on 
the alternatives considered in an EA or EIS, the cumulative impacts of a federal action, 
                                                 
129 Together, the two Circuits accounted over our sample period for about 85 percent of the district court and 75 
percent of appellate cases involving governments that spanned more than one circuit. 
130 Over the 15 years covered by the study, only the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits had more than 31 district court 
cases or more than 25 appellate cases. These estimates are based on the auto-coding of cases and thus represent 
upper bounds on the actual number of cases filed in each circuit at the district and appellate levels. 
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mitigation measures contemplated by an agency, and the scope of the NEPA analysis (see Tables 
2 & 3 in the Appendix). These four classes of claims, along with challenges to uses of 
categorical exclusions and demands for supplemental EISs, were the only substantive claims 
raised in more than 10 percent of the district court cases. The sole exception to this rule were 
claims challenging plaintiffs’ constitutional standing to sue; although the single most frequently 
claim litigated (see Table 4 in the Appendix), they rarely succeeded.131 
The appellate cases also displayed a similar lack of variation in the frequency of claims 
filed across federal agencies and circuits. The rates at which specific claims were appealed 
largely followed their frequency in the district court cases;132 in essence, the same small number 
of NEPA claims raised at the district court level reappear in the appeals (see Tables 7 & 8 in the 
Appendix). The four classes of challenges noted above to the content of EAs and EISs, along 
with claims requesting supplemental EISs, were the only substantive claims raised in more than 
10 percent of the appeals. Constitutional standing was also the single most frequent issue 
litigated (see Table 7 in the Appendix), but it was once again exceedingly rare for defendants to 
succeed with such challenges.133 The circuit court cases therefore reinforce the district court 
findings—a subset of claims tends to predominate in NEPA cases but no single claim or 
collection of claims had a substantially greater likelihood of succeeding and none was 
statistically significant.134 
 The NEPA claims raised most frequently were, by in large, the ones most commentators 
would predict. Their attractiveness to plaintiffs has several elements. Perhaps most importantly, 
these claims challenge the fundamental legitimacy of an agency’s analysis—the alternatives 
analysis, for example, is viewed by courts as the “heart of the NEPA process.”135 Similarly, 
failure to consider cumulative impacts,136 or reliance on improper or poorly described mitigation 
methods,137 can be determinative of whether NEPA applies and what level of analysis, an EA or 
EIS, is required. Moreover, at least some of legal doctrines (such as the adequacy of alternatives 
analysis) has the virtue that they are less likely to implicate complex technical details that are 
difficult for courts to assess and thus may receive a higher degree of judicial scrutiny. On the 
other hand, segmentation claims, which are conceptually close cousins of cumulative impacts, 
are rare—a mere 2 percent of the cases. This finding is significant because it runs counter to the 
                                                 
131 We found that constitutional standing was a basis for the court’s ruling in roughly 6 percent of the cases. 
132 The only notable exception was challenges to “findings of no significant impact,” so called “FONSI” claims, 
which occurred twice as often in appeals (36 percent of the cases) as they did at the district court level (13 percent of 
the cases). However, the higher rate of FONSI claims tracked the higher rate of appeals for challenging EAs. It may 
be that plaintiffs believe that EAs are easier to challenge given that, by definition, the environmental reviews they 
contain are more superficial; however, we do not see any basis for such a view in our data. As an additional check, 
we included FONSI and EA claims as a dummy variable in the regression discussed below and did not find them to 
be statistically significant predictors of success in NEPA appeals.  
133 We found that constitutional standing was a basis for the court’s ruling in favor of agency defendants in roughly 
5 percent of the appeals. 
134 This finding is based on a combination of analyses based on Chi2 tests and logistic regressions conducted using 
dummy variables for each of the most common claims (alternatives, cumulative impacts, mitigation measure, and 
scope). It is important to note that the small number of cases for many claims was a limiting factor statistically. 
135 See Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14). 
136 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2016). 
137 See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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importance that many scholars have attached to segmentation as a barrier to effective 
implementation of NEPA, but may be explained by less favorable case law on segmentation than 
on cumulative impacts or by the likelihood that if a litigant can raise a segmentation claim, it can 
also couch it in terms of insufficient cumulative impact analysis.138 
Figure 3: Duration of NEPA Litigation in District Courts 
 
The final descriptive statistics that we examined were the rates at which cases settled and 
the duration of NEPA litigation.139 Using subsamples taken from cases filed during the Bush and 
Obama Administrations, we found that 40 percent of the district court cases were either settled or 
dismissed during the Bush Administration versus 29 percent during the Obama 
Administration.140 Plaintiffs were therefore both much less likely to prevail in their NEPA claims 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., Mark A. Chertok, Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Alternatives, SR045 ALI-ABA 757 , 773 (2010) (“While segmentation per se is not unlawful, courts 
are skeptical of attempts to divide projects into segments in order to circumvent the mandate of NEPA.”); Mary-
Kaitlin E. Rigney, Clogging the Pipeline: Exploring the D.C. Circuit's Improper Segmentation Analysis in Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network v. FERC and Its Implications for the United States’s Domestic Natural Gas Production, 64 
AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1479 (2015) “[T]the rule against segmentation has developed through common law to prevent 
agencies from dividing overall plans into component-parts and thereby avoiding the NEPA requirement of a 
comprehensive EIS.”); see generally Robert D. Comer, NEPA Compliance in Oil and Gas Leasing: Lease Hold 
Segmentation and the Decision to Forego an Environmental Impact Statement, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 677 (1988). 
139 To gain a statistical measure of the duration of NEPA litigation, we used a sample of roughly 300 NEPA cases 
litigated during the Bush Administration. 
140 Determining settlement rates is difficult. “No single, agreed method of computing settlement rates exists because 
judgment calls exist how about to translate a range of formal case outcomes into the dichotomous characterization of 
settled or not settled. There may not even be a single ‘best’ measure of the settlement rate.” Theodore Eisenberg & 
Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 114 
(2009). One study found that about 70% of federal court cases in a database maintained by the Administrative Office 
of U.S. Courts that terminated between 1979 and 2006 settled. Id. at 116 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications (2009), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/109/). See generally Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 381–83 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds. 2007) (reviewing empirical settlement literature). 
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and less likely to settle during the Obama Administration. If the average case during the Obama 
Administration were weaker than the average during the Bush Administration, this shift could 
simply reflect the weaker cohort of cases rather than a decision by the Obama Administration to 
raise the bar for entering into settlements. We believe that the disparity in settlement rates 
supports the inference that NEPA compliance was more lax during the Bush Administration for 
the simple reason that one would expect, all other factors being equal, that an administration with 
weak environmental commitments would be more likely to adopt a hardline strategy that views 
settlement as an option of last resort.141 Yet, we observe just the opposite—higher settlement 
rates during the Bush Administration—suggesting that the level of NEPA compliance was often 
sufficiently low to compel lawyers during the Bush Administration to settle. 
Our data on the duration of NEPA litigation were limited to the Bush Administration. While 
we would have preferred to have data covering both administrations, we do not expect that the 
length of litigation is likely to change substantially between administrations, as it is largely 
dictated by either the courts or the plaintiffs—in part, because federal agencies so rarely appeal 
NEPA cases.142 That may be because the time needed to conduct a new NEPA study may not 
differ significantly than the anticipated length of litigation. At any rate, duration is a key variable 
practically and politically because one of the recurring critiques leveled against NEPA is that its 
procedures and the litigation surrounding them has undermined federal programs by unduly 
burdening decision-making processes. By the standards of federal administrative litigation,143 we 
find weak evidence for these claims (see Figure 3). The median duration of a NEPA case was 
less than 2 years (23 months), and 75 percent of the cases were resolved within 3.2 years (39 
months). Moreover, for the subset of cases in which the federal government prevailed, the 
median duration was just 1.5 years and 75 percent of the cases were resolved within 3 years (36 
months).144  
The descriptive statistics alone allow us to reject our hypotheses that procedural claims 
are more likely to succeed and that suits against federal agencies with higher rates of NEPA 
litigation are less likely to succeed (hypotheses 8 and 10). We do find evidence that case 
outcomes are influenced by the presidential administration, circuit in which a suit is filed, and 
class of plaintiff at the district and appellate court levels (hypotheses 6, 7, and 9). However, the 
                                                 
141 This inference is reinforced by the substantially higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs during the Bush 
Administration. See infra at Part II.B. 
142 In our appellate sample, federal agencies were the appellee in less than three percent of the cases. 
143 See Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital Resource in the Era of 
Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269, 1289 (2005) (citing U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management 
Statistics, Judicial Caseload Profile Report 2003, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-court-
management-statistics-2003) (finding that the average duration of a federal civil case from filing to trial increased 
from 19.5 to 22.5 months between 1998 and 2003); Jessica Kier, Raising the Bar: How Will the New Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure Affect Your Required Level of Competency?, 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 105 (2014) (reporting that 
the median duration for securities class-action lawsuits was three and a half years); Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence 
and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 307 (2005) (“Between 1990 and 1998, the percentage of general federal civil rights cases 
resolved within two years increased from 82 percent to 88 percent . . . .”). 
144 For cases in which the federal government wins, 50 percent of the cases are resolved within about 1.5 years; 75 
percent resolved within 3 years; 90 percent of the cases are resolved within 5 years. For cases in which the plaintiff 
prevails on at least one claim, 50 percent of the cases are resolved within 2.5 years; 75 percent resolved within about 
4.3 years; and 90 percent of the cases are resolved within 6.2 years. 
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descriptive statistics do not include any controls and thus on their own are inconclusive. In the 
subsection that follows, we discuss multiple regressions that include the potential explanatory 
variables along with several key control variables. 
B. The Influence of Presidential Politics, Federal Circuit, and Judicial Ideology on 
the Outcome of NEPA Cases 
We conducted a variety of statistical tests and subdivided the sample data along several 
dimensions, most notably by Circuit, presidential administration, federal agency, and judicial 
ideology,145 to test our starting hypotheses about their impact on case outcomes. This analysis 
provides strong evidence for the influence of presidential politics, judicial ideology, and the 
circuit in which a case is filed, but consistent with the results above, no evidence that the federal 
agency or specific NEPA claims were significant factors. At the highest level of aggregation, we 
find large differences in outcomes between cases filed during the Bush Administration and those 
filed during the Obama Administration. Specifically, plaintiffs were almost twice as likely to win 
at the district court level during the Bush Administration than the Obama Administration, and 
they were 75 percent more likely to win at the appellate level.146 This result supports our 
hypothesis that NEPA compliance was less rigorous during the Bush Administration (hypothesis 
3), but there are other important factors that could be at play and that must be considered. 
Statistically and practically significant impacts were clearly associated with the circuit of 
origin. Plaintiffs were more than twice as likely to prevail at the district court level in the Ninth 
and D.C. Circuits relative to other circuits (collectively) during the Bush Administration,147 and 
they continued to prevail almost twice as often in the Ninth Circuit during the Obama 
Administration, albeit at a lower absolute rate.148 On appeal, only the Ninth Circuit was a more 
favorable venue, with plaintiffs prevailing 31 percent of the time versus 14 percent in other 
circuits collectively.149 However, unlike the district court cases, the advantage of filing an appeal 
in the Ninth Circuit disappeared statistically during the Obama Administration—dropping from a 
                                                 
145 Judicial ideology was defined by the party of the appointing president: judges appointed by Republican 
presidents were designated as Republican judges; judges appointed by Democratic presidents were designated as 
Democratic judges. The party of the appointing president is a rough proxy for judicial ideology, but it has the virtue 
that it errs on the side of obscuring the impact of ideology because the party of the appointing president does not 
necessarily reflect the ideology of the judge. Accordingly, if we observe a statistically significant effect it is likely to 
be a lower bound on the actual influence of ideology. 
146 Plaintiffs won 39 percent of the district court cases during the Bush Administration versus 20 percent of the 
district court cases during the Obama Administration. At the appellate level, plaintiffs won 28 percent of the cases 
during the Bush Administration versus 16 percent of the cases during the Obama Administration.  
147 At the district court level, plaintiffs succeeded at a relatively high rate, 35 percent of the cases, in Tenth Circuit 
cases during the Bush Administration and at a relatively high rate overall, 28 percent of the cases; however, on 
appeal plaintiffs were much less likely to prevail in the Tenth Circuit than other circuits, 5 percent versus about 17 
percent for all circuits excluding the Ninth Circuit. 
148 During the Bush Administration, plaintiffs won about 45 percent of the cases in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits 
versus 23 percent of the cases in all other circuits; during the Obama Administration, plaintiffs won 24 percent of 
the cases in the Ninth Circuit versus 14 percent of the cases in all other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit. 
149 Here, too, the disparity was much greater during the Bush Administration (40 percent in the Ninth Circuit versus 
16 percent in other circuits collectively) than the Obama Administration (19 versus 13 percent, respectively). 
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factor of 2.8 to 1.38.150 Given the absence of statistically significant differences across federal 
agencies, this finding suggests that district judges in the Ninth Circuit were less deferential than 
district judges in other circuits during both administrations, whereas Ninth Circuit appellate and 
D.C. Circuit district judges were less deferential only during the Bush Administration. We 
believe that these shifts in case outcomes were likely associated with the number of cases, 
circuit-level dynamics, and the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in each 
circuit; Part III discusses this and other related issues in detail. 
The influence of judicial ideology on case outcomes is both more complex, particularly at 
the appellate level, and less pronounced than the impact of circuit and presidential politics. At 
the district court level, the difference in plaintiff success rates between judges appointed by a 
Republican president and judges appointed by a Democratic president was statistically and 
practically significant, respectively 31 versus 48 percent, during the Bush Administration; 
however, it dropped to 14 and 24 percent, respectively, during the Obama Administration and 
was no longer statistically significant. In short, the influence of judicial ideology changed with 
the shift in presidential politics—it was high when the conservative ideology of the Bush 
Administration was in tension with the liberal environmental statutory mandate of NEPA and 
relatively modest when NEPA policies were aligned with the priorities of the Obama 
Administration. 
At the appellate level, the influence of judicial ideology was complicated by the 
permutations of three-judge panels. Similar to prior studies of judicial ideology in appellate 
courts, we observed the greatest differences in case outcomes when panels were ideologically 
uniform, either all Republican or all Democratic appointees, whereas ideologically mixed panels 
moderated case outcomes.151 During the Bush Administration, plaintiffs prevailed twice as often 
before a majority-Democratic panel as before a majority-Republican panel and four times the 
                                                 
150 Plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit during the Bush Administration prevailed in 42 percent of the NEPA cases versus 
15 percent in all other circuits collectively; during the Obama Administration, plaintiff success rates dropped to 18 
and 15 percent, respectively.  
151 See, e.g., Kevin M. Quinn, The Academic Study of Decision Making on Multimember Courts, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
1493, 1494 (2012) (asserting that “judges decide some types of cases differently depending on the identities of their 
colleagues on a panel”); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An 
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (2009) (finding that “the tendency of appeals 
court judges to be influenced by their panel colleagues does depend on how the preferences of the circuit court as a 
whole are aligned relative to those of the panel members.”); Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy, 
supra note 18, at 823 (concluding that “[i]n lower court decisions involving the EPA and the NLRB from 1990 to 
2004, Republican appointees demonstrated a greater willingness to invalidate liberal agency decisions and those of 
Democratic administrations. These differences are greatly amplified when Republican appointees sit with two 
Republican appointees and when Democratic appointees sit with two Democratic appointees.”); Sunstein et al., 
supra note 18, at 301 (finding “ideological dampening” and “ideological amplification” in a wide variety of federal 
cases); Revesz, supra note 18, at 1764 (1997) (concluding that “while individual ideology and panel composition 
both have important effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote 
than one’s own ideology”); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (concluding that 
judges' votes were influenced not only by their political affiliation, but also by the composition of the panel on 
which they sat); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (2008) 
(finding that the ideology of other judges on the panel affects judges’ votes in Voting Rights Act cases). 
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rate before an all-Republican panel.152 Similar to the circuit effects, the impact of judicial 
ideology diminished during the Obama Administration, with plaintiff success rates converging to 
9-13 percent for both all-Republican and ideologically mixed panels. The one exception was 
plaintiff success rates before all-Democratic panels, which declined only modestly during the 
Obama Administration.153 While we cannot know whether the long-term baseline is closer to the 
level observed during the Bush or Obama Administrations,154 the relative influence of judicial 
ideology as measured by the difference between majority-Democratic and majority-Republican 
panels is striking and may be generalizable to statutes that reflect traditionally conservative 
issues (e.g., immigration, regulatory reform, school choice) as well. The relative invariance of 
all-Democratic panels is also notable and suggests that Democratic judges are less deferential to 
agencies regardless of the administration.  
One important difference to note between the district court and appellate cases is that 
federal defendants can initiate appeals. Of the 342 appellate cases in our sample, 24 of them were 
initiated by federal or private defendants or involved a cross appeal. Although representing less 
than 10 percent of the appeals, these cases are notable for their relatively high success rates—
whereas plaintiffs won just 20 percent of the appeals they initiated, defendants won 38 percent of 
their appeals.155 Thus a defendant-initiated appeal was almost twice as likely to succeed as one 
initiated by a plaintiff. One must be careful, however, when interpreting these results because the 
small number of defendant-initiated appeals could reflect a high bar for pursuing appeals,156 
thereby strictly limiting appeals to cases with a high likelihood of succeeding. Nevertheless, 
because such judgments are made against adverse lower court rulings and often complex factual 
settings, it would take exceptionally good case selection to account for the dramatically different 
success rates. Accordingly, we suspect that the difference in case outcomes may also reflect a 
heightened level of deference appellate courts apply when a federal agency is the appellee, and 
that this may partially offset the weight circuit judges give to a lower court’s ruling. 
  
                                                 
152 Before a majority-Republican panel, plaintiffs prevailed in 20 percent of the cases and in just 5 percent of the 
cases before an all-Republican panel; by contrast, plaintiffs won 41 percent of their appeals before all- or majority-
Democratic judge panels. 
153 For all-Democratic panels, plaintiffs prevailed at roughly the same rates over both administrations—41 versus 33 
percent, which was a similar degree of convergence observed at the district court level. By contrast, all-Republican 
panels displayed a greater level of deference towards the Bush Administration (ruling in its favor in 95 percent of 
the cases) and converged to the rates of mixed panels during the Obama Administration (9-13 percent). The small 
number of cases with ideologically uniform judges limits the inferences we can draw from the results. 
154 At least one earlier study suggests that the average is closer to rates observed during the Obama Administration. 
Malmsheimer et al., supra note 95, at 22 (finding that the USFS prevailed in 64 percent of the NEPA cases during 
the George H.W. Bush Administration and 80 percent of the cases during the Clinton Administration). 
155 We have lumped together all of the instances in which an appeal is at least partly initiated by a federal or private 
defendant due to the small number of such cases in our sample. There may be significant differences between the 
subsets of cases—in particular, defendants other than federal agencies actually prevailed at a higher rate than federal 
defendants, 44 versus 33 percent of the cases they appealed.  
156 Federal defendants won 71 percent of the district court cases, but defendants filed less than 7 percent of the 
appeals in the sample. This disparity implies that defendants filed only about a quarter of the appeals predicted based 
on the number of their losses in district court. 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression for District Court Case Outcomes  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling 
      
Administration 0.379*** 0.374*** 0.362*** 0.399*** 0.379*** 
 (-4.27) (-4.34) (-4.53) (-4.34) (-4.64) 
      
D.C. Circuit157 1.771 1.620 1.757 1.867 1.914 
 (1.47) (1.26) (1.49) (1.67) (1.75) 
      
Ninth Circuit 2.831*** 2.607*** 2.468*** 2.320** 2.576*** 
 (3.64) (3.51) (3.37) (3.22) (3.69) 
      
National Environmental 2.614** 2.476** 2.539** 2.777*** 1.695* 
Organization (3.07) (2.93) (3.02) (3.40) (2.30) 
      
Local Environmental 2.080* 1.945* 1.972* 2.092**  
Organization (2.49) (2.36) (2.42) (2.70)  
      
Appointing President’s 1.904** 1.809** 1.851**   
Party for Judge (2.83) (2.64) (2.76)   
      
Case Published 1.382 1.375    
 (1.37) (1.35)    
      
Federal Lands Agency 0.797     
 (-0.84)     
      
Federal Natural Resource 0.546     
Management Agency (-1.68)     
N 462 462 462 462 462 
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
We conducted multiple regressions using the district and appellate court data.158 Table 2 
displays the results from five logistic regressions using a range of parameters to test the 
statistical significance and influence of key variables relative to each other. The dependent 
variable in each regression is case outcome, where success was defined as a plaintiff prevailing 
                                                 
157 The baseline for the likelihood ratio is the odds of a plaintiff winning a NEPA case at the district court level in 
one of the circuits other than the Ninth and D.C. Circuits. 
158 Because the dependent variable—whether the plaintiff prevailed on at least one of its NEPA claims—was 
categorical, logistic regression was used in place of conventional ordinary-least-squares regression. ALAN C. 
ACOCK, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA 302-04 (3rd ed., 2012). This type of regression generates a “likelihood” 
or “odds” ratio, which in our analysis is simply the ratio of the likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing when the value of 
the applicable dummy variable is “one” over the likelihood when it is “zero.” For example, the dummy variable 
presidential administration in our analysis designates the Bush Administration as “0” and the Obama Administration 
as “1.” Accordingly, the likelihood ratio is the odds of a plaintiff winning its case during the Obama Administration 
over the odds of a plaintiff prevailing during the Bush Administration. In this case, a likelihood ratio of “0.5” 
implies that a plaintiff has a 50 percent lower chance of winning a NEPA suit during the Obama Administration than 
during the Bush Administration; conversely, a likelihood ratio of “1.5” implies that a plaintiff has a 50 percent 
greater chance of prevailing during the Obama Administration. 
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on at least one of its NEPA claims. Likelihood ratios for plaintiff success rates appear above the 
z-values,159 which are in brackets, and the asterisks indicate the degree of statistical significance 
for each parameter. We also conducted additional regressions to assess whether specific NEPA 
claims were predictive of case outcome. Only one type of claim, challenges to mitigation 
measures in an EIS, generated results that were remotely close to being statistically significant; 
however, the effect was weak and the lack of statistical significance led us to drop it in the final 
set of regressions.160 
All five logistic regressions in Table 2 indicate that plaintiffs’ success rates at the district 
court level were influenced strongly by the presidential administration, whether the case was 
filed in the Ninth Circuit,161 and whether the plaintiff was an environmental organization.162 
Plaintiffs were less than half as likely to succeed in a NEPA action during the Obama 
administration than during the Bush Administration; they were roughly 2.5 times more likely to 
succeed in the Ninth Circuit; and plaintiffs were 2 to 2.5 times more likely to prevail if they were 
a local or national environmental organization.163 Although the magnitude of the effect was 
lower, the regressions show that the political affiliation of the district judge influenced case 
outcomes, with judges appointed by a democratic president 80 percent more likely to rule in 
favor of a plaintiff. By contrast, the defendant federal agency (focusing here on the federal lands 
and natural resource management agencies) was not a statistically significant factor. 
These results confirm the association of presidential administration, class of plaintiff, 
circuit, and judicial ideology with the outcomes of district court cases. We conducted regressions 
with interaction terms to test whether the variables operated independently; none of the 
interaction terms was found to be statistically significant, which means that there was no 
evidence that the variables were influencing each other. The statistical significance and 
independence of the circuit variable implies that inter-circuit differences cannot be reduced to the 
ideology of judges—some structural feature of the circuits must also be at work. These dynamics 
are particularly novel because they reflect both absolute and relative changes in the rates at 
which plaintiffs prevailed before Democratic and Republican judges. In Part III we will argue 
that this combination of absolute and relative changes in case outcomes is driven by the degree 
of alignment between the ideology of the judge, the liberal values of NEPA, and the politics of 
the presidential administration in power. Misalignment of presidential politics with NEPA’s 
goals is found to magnify the influence of judicial ideology on case outcomes. 
 
                                                 
159 A “z-value” is a complementary measure of statistical significance that indicates the number of standard 
deviations the observed data deviate from the value predicted by the statistical model. 
160 The association was also negative—mitigation claims were about 40 percent less likely to succeed than average. 
161 The statistical significance of the coefficient for the D.C. Circuit may have been limited by statistical power. 
Only 60 cases were filed in the D.C. Circuit, which while large relative to most circuits, was small for purposes of 
statistical power—for our data, the statistical power was less than 60 for any sample with fewer than 94 cases. 
162 The dummy variable designating whether or not a case was published was included as a control variable. 
163 The success rates of environmental plaintiffs diverged somewhat across administrations—national environmental 
organizations had higher success rates than local ones (53 versus 40 percent, respectively) during the Bush 
Administration but they converged during the Obama Administration (25 and 21 percent, respectively). 
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Table 3: Logistic Regression for Appeals Outcome 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling 
      
Other Circuits- 2.171* 2.294* 2.757** 3.054*** 3.646*** 
Ninth Circuit (2.22) (2.43) (3.25) (3.62) (4.31) 
      
Administration164 0.553 0.537* 0.572 0.555* 0.516* 
 (-1.95) (-2.06) (-1.89) (-2.00) (-2.28) 
      
Case Published165 2.742** 2.646* 2.611* 2.724** 3.286** 
 (2.63) (2.56) (2.56) (2.69) (3.24) 
      
Hard Look 0.441* 0.448* 0.442* 0.473* 0.422** 
 (-2.37) (-2.33) (-2.43) (-2.26) (-2.63) 
      
Appellee 0.210** 0.219** 0.223** 0.259**  
 (-2.86) (-2.81) (-2.94) (-2.72)  
      
Environmental 1.953 2.094* 2.032*   
Organization (1.94) (2.21) (2.17)   
      
Circuit Panel 0.730 0.770    
3-Reps (-0.52) (-0.43)    
      
Circuit Panel 1.283 1.291    
1-Rep/2-Dems (0.68) (0.70)    
      
Circuit Panel 2.207 2.247    
3-Dems (1.81) (1.86)    
      
Federal Land 1.317     
Agency (0.86)     
N 330 330 334 334 334 
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The regressions for the appellate cases appear in Table 3 above. The dependent variable 
in each regression is again case outcome, with success defined as a plaintiff prevailing on at least 
one of its NEPA claims. The other statistics in Table 3 mirror those of Table 2 apart from 
judicial ideology, which treats the four different combinations of three judges separately using 
panels with two Republican-appointed judges and one Democratic-appointed judge as the 
baseline against which the likelihood ratios for the other three panels are calculated. Similar to 
the district court cases, we conducted multiple regressions on specific NEPA claims, only one of 
                                                 
164 The time lag associated with appeals makes it more difficult to define when one administration stops and another 
begins, as an appeal may originate in actions that occurred in a prior administration. We experimented with different 
cutoff dates and found overall relatively minor differences in the results. As a consequence, we adopted a “middle of 
the road” approach that defines the Bush Administration as encompassing all Circuit cases filed between 2002 and 
2009, and the Obama Administration as encompassing all cases filed between 2010 and 2015. 
165 Whether the case was published is a control variable, but it does not change the results significantly if it is 
excluded. The principal impact is on the Ninth Circuit variable, which falls below statistical significance if 
publication is removed. The coefficients for other independent variables change only modestly. 
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which, whether an agency took a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of a federal action, 
was statistically significant. Consideration of whether an agency took a hard look reduced the 
likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing by more than 50 percent. However, judges used the hard look 
rubric in a generic manner that raises questions of endogeneity—judges convinced on 
independent technical grounds about the adequacy of an agency’s analysis often ended their 
analysis by concluding that the agency had undertaken the required hard look. With regard to 
other NEPA claims, the smaller sample size for our appellate database and the low rates at which 
most were raised limited the statistical power of our analysis. 
The regression coefficients in Table 3 for the Ninth Circuit and environmental plaintiffs 
are each statistically and practically significant. On appeal, plaintiffs were roughly 2.5 times 
more likely to win in the Ninth Circuit; similarly, environmental plaintiffs were about two times 
more likely to prevail than other classes of plaintiffs, although the statistical significance of this 
finding was weaker. The coefficient for presidential administration was practically significant --  
plaintiffs were about half as likely to succeed on appeal during the Obama Administration 
relative to the Bush Administration – but it was at the margin for statistical significance. Given 
that our sample includes over 340 cases and is almost equally divided between the Bush and 
Obama Administrations, this is unlikely to be a problem of limited statistical power.166 We 
therefore cannot confidently reject the possibility that the observed inter-administration disparity 
in case outcomes was a product of random variation. Finally, the identity of the appellee, 
whether it was a defendant or plaintiff, is also a significant factor despite the small number of 
appeals initiated by defendants (a total of 23 cases); plaintiffs were only about one-fourth as 
likely to prevail on appeal as defendants. 
The results of the regression for the appellate cases differ from those of the lower courts 
with respect to the influence of presidential administration and judicial ideology. These 
differences derive largely from the structural differences at the appellate level. First, the added 
layer of case selection (only about a quarter of NEPA cases was appealed) narrows the range of 
cases based on likelihood of success.167 Thus, while the number of cases that could be appealed 
may have been higher during the Bush Administration, the likelihood of prevailing may change 
very little if appellees selected cases with similar likelihoods of succeeding during both 
administrations.168 The weak statistical significance of the coefficient for presidential 
administration is consistent with these selection effects. Second, the role of ideology on three-
judge panels is complicated both because judges with divergent ideologies influence each other 
and because a strong norm of unanimity exists among circuit judges.169 Together, these 
                                                 
166 We conducted a power analysis on the data using a two-tailed test and the “powerlog” command in Stata; it 
estimated that a sample size of 112 would have a power of 0.90. 
167 Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337-38 (1990) [hereinafter Selection Effect]; Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose 
Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates, 15 AM. L. ECON. REV. 73, 105 (2013); 
John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation, 21 J. L. ECON. 
ORG. 501, 503-04 (2005). 
168 Eisenberg, Selection Effect, supra note 167, at 338 (affirming the importance of selection effects on appeal). 
169 This norm is clearly evident in our sample data: dissents were filed in just 5.5% of the cases. See Sean Farhang & 
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel 
Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 307 (2004) (observing that the norm of consensus on appellate panels 
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differences tend to reduce the influence of judicial ideology on mixed panels, which predominate 
in circuits with relatively balanced numbers of judges based on political affiliation. A moderation 
of ideological influence is precisely what we observe—only modest differences in the 
coefficients for ideologically mixed panels that lack statistical significance.170 Interestingly, the 
results for ideologically uniform panels were mixed: the coefficient for all Republican-appointed 
panels does not differ meaningfully in absolute terms whereas the one for all Democratic-
appointed panels is higher by a factor of two; unfortunately, the statistical power was limited in 
both cases by the small sample sizes.171 In sum, the only cases for which judicial ideology could 
be a significant factor at the appellate level were those with all Democratic-appointed judges on 
the panel.172 
 Three factors at the appellate level remain important—whether the case was filed in the 
Ninth Circuit, whether the plaintiff was an environmental organization, and whether the appellee 
was a defendant. The persistence of circuit effects at the appellate level in the Ninth Circuit 
highlights the importance of a circuit having a large share of the cases because the number of 
cases with ideologically uniform three-judge panels scales with the total number of cases.173 
Further, if there is an imbalance in the number of Republican and Democratic judges in a circuit, 
this will elevate the number of panels dominated by judges with the political affiliation in the 
majority. The Ninth Circuit is an outlier on both counts—it heard more than 50 percent of the 
NEPA appeals and 59 percent of its appellate judges were appointed by Democratic 
presidents.174 With these statistics, it should come as no surprise that 65 percent of the NEPA 
appeals nationally with majority-Democratic panels and 83 percent of those with all Democratic-
appointed panels were in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, within the Ninth Circuit 73 percent of the 
NEPA appeals were heard by majority Democratic-appointee panels and 25 percent were heard 
by all Democratic-appointee panels (roughly double the rate, on average, if there were equal 
numbers of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges).175 Accordingly, the elevated success 
rates of plaintiffs on appeal were driven by rudimentary statistics associated with the Ninth 
Circuit’s location in the western United States, large geographic scale, and bias towards 
Democratic-appointed appellate judges.  
                                                 
stems from “a view among judges that unanimous court opinions promote the appearance of legal objectivity, 
certainty, and neutrality, which fosters courts’ institutional legitimacy”). 
170 The baseline for the regression is a panel with two Republican-appointed judges and one Democratic. The results 
in Table 3 show that the increase in plaintiff success rate above this baseline for a panel with two Democratic-
appointed judges and one Republican is less than 30 percent and that it is not statistically significant. 
171 Because of the adverse combinatorics, uniform panels were relatively rare in our sample, representing 37 and 52 
cases for the all Republican-appointed and all Democratic-appointed panels, respectively. 
172 While the coefficient in the regression is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, a much larger study 
would have to be conducted to achieve the necessary statistical power given that fifteen years of data produced just 
52 cases with all Democratic-appointed panels. However, the sample size, which represents roughly two-thirds of 
the 2001-15 appeals, gives us sufficient confidence to treat the coefficient as meaningful and not a statistical fluke. 
173 By contrast, the small number of NEPA cases heard in most circuits (typically less than one case per year) 
reduces the probability of having more than a couple of ideologically uniform panels to essentially zero.  
174 In our full sample, 49 percent of the judges were appointed by Democratic presidents and 51 percent were 
appointed by Republican presidents. The split in D.C. Circuit was close to the national average—47 versus 53 
percent for Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges, respectively; however, the split in Tenth Circuit was 41 
versus 59 percent for Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges, respectively. 
175 By contrast, only a single appeal was heard by an all Democratic-appointed panel in the D.C., Tenth, or Sixth 
Circuits, which were the only other circuits with more than 15 cases in our sample. 
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  The statistics for appeals initiated by defendants are similarly skewed towards the Ninth 
Circuit, which heard 83 percent of these appeals, as well as the Bush Administration, during 
which 75 percent of the defendant-initiated appeals were filed. However, all Democratic-
appointed panels were only modestly over-represented in the defendant-initiated appeals and the 
absolute number (five cases) was small. Ultimately, the limited number of defendant-initiated 
appeals limits what we can infer beyond that defendants appear to have a significant advantage 
over plaintiffs on appeal. The final factor, the higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs on 
appeal, is important because it underscores the relative merits of their claims and thus provides 
further evidence against assertions that environmental plaintiffs file NEPA lawsuits for purely 
strategic ends and in spite of the dubious legal grounds for their claims.  
III.  Implications for NEPA, Judicial Review, and Administrative Procedure 
This section examines the implications of our results for the debates surrounding NEPA, 
factors that determine the influence of judicial ideology in administrative challenges, and the 
limits of augmented administrative procedures. Subsection A reassesses common critiques of 
NEPA and the litigation surrounding it in light of our findings. Subsection B describes and 
proposes a conceptual framework for understanding the interplay we observe between 
presidential politics and the influence of ideology during judicial review. Finally, subsection C 
discusses the implications of our findings for other forms of augmented administrative 
procedures, focusing on enhanced procedures reflected in the recent proliferation of executive 
orders and pending legislation that expand requirements for regulatory impact assessments. 
A. The Lack of Empirical Support for Critics’ Claims Against NEPA 
Our findings negate much of the conventional wisdom promoted by critics of NEPA. In 
conjunction with data on NEPA compliance, we find that the vast majority of agencies decisions 
that have the potential to significantly impact the environment require only perfunctory review 
under CEs or relatively streamlined reviews under EAs; in comparison, the number of EISs 
prepared is tiny and has been gradually declining over the last decade or so.176 The number of 
cases filed under NEPA has remained relatively constant, with about 100 cases filed in district 
courts annually (about 35 percent of which settle) and roughly 25 appeals. Given that the number 
of federal actions potentially subject to NEPA is roughly 100 thousand or so annually,177 
litigation rates are exceedingly low; even among actions requiring EISs, which pose the greatest 
potential threats to the environment, on average 20 percent are challenged178 and just 13 percent 
are actually litigated.179 
 These numbers represent national averages that obscure the highly skewed nature of 
NEPA litigation that this and previous studies have exposed. For most federal agencies, a NEPA 
lawsuit is a rare event and claims that NEPA poses a significant burden have little basis in fact. 
                                                 
176 See also Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 348 (characterizing the number of federal actions each year that trigger EIS 
preparation duties “a vanishingly small number given the scale and scope of federal operations”). 
177 See infra Part I.A. 
178 See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE 
SYSTEM (2014) (“The percentage of EISs challenged in court has remained relatively stable, . . . fluctuating between 
15 and 20 percent of all EISs filed.”). 
179 See infra Part I.A.  
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For the subset of federal land and natural resource management agencies that account for three-
quarters of the NEPA cases filed, the implications are more mixed. The rates of litigation relative 
to the number of EISs prepared by these agencies (see Table 1 above) suggest that litigation rates 
are roughly proportional to covered federal actions for the BLM, substantially lower for the 
USACE, and to varying degrees substantially higher for the USFS, FWS, and NMFS. However, 
if we apply the national averages, a little more than 25 percent of EISs issued by the USFS are 
challenged and 18 percent are actually litigated. These percentages are significant particularly as 
the total number of cases filed against the USFS averages about 35 each year. In the case of the 
FWS and NMFS, the litigation rates are higher but the total number of EISs is low (averaging 
just 8 and 3 EISs per year, respectively). Thus, in absolute terms, the burden from NEPA for 
either of these agencies, particularly considering parallel requirements under the Endangered 
Species Act,180 is not likely to be significant. Taken together, given the small percentage of 
actions for which agencies prepare time-intensive EISs, in practice only the USFS is subject to a 
volume of NEPA litigation that raises the potential for substantial added administrative burdens 
on the agency.181 
The low frequency and implied selectivity of NEPA litigation are reflected in the relative 
success of environmental plaintiffs. Environmental organizations prevailed at consistently higher 
rates than other plaintiffs filing NEPA actions, and their success in court was comparable to or 
exceeded that of plaintiffs generally in administrative challenges.182 By these benchmarks, the 
merits of NEPA challenges filed by environmental plaintiffs are inconsistent with claims that 
NEPA suits are filed merely to hold up agency action and lack legitimate legal grounds. The high 
success rates of environmental plaintiffs, who prevailed in about 45 percent of their cases during 
the Bush Administration, is further evidence countering the charge that they used NEPA for 
purely strategic objectives. To the extent that NEPA is used purely to hold up government action, 
one would expect this tactic to occur more frequently with administrations less committed to 
environmentally conscientious compliance with NEPA and CEQ mandates. Yet, we observe just 
the opposite—on average, the merits of NEPA claims were substantially stronger during the 
Bush Administration. 
A principal reason that NEPA has not overburdened agencies is that the CEQ regulations 
authorize agencies to tailor the level of environmental review to the nature of the action and its 
likely effects. The courts have endorsed this approach by allowing agencies to determine, subject 
to arbitrary and capricious review,183 whether a proposal requires an EA or an EIS184 or is 
appropriately covered by a CE.185 NEPA procedures, therefore, are calibrated according to the 
likelihood that a proposal will have significant environmental impacts. This approach has 
                                                 
180 The Endangered Species Act requires agencies proposing to take actions that are likely to jeopardize listed 
species or adversely modify their critical habitat to consult with other the FWS or NMFS in the preparation of a 
biological opinion that recommends less damaging alternatives. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). A finding of a lesser 
likelihood of jeopardy or adverse modification can justify the preparation of less comprehensive documentation. 
181 The USFS’s expanded use of CEs since the mid-2000s may mitigate these burdens, particularly in light of how 
rarely CEs are challenged; however, the USFS must be careful not to abuse this option. deWitt, supra note 64, at 
172; Native Ecosystems Council v. Weldon, 2016 WL 4591897, at *2 (D. Mont. 2016) (observing that a CE “is not 
an ‘escape NEPA free’ card”). 
182 See note 143. 
183 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
184 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.13 (2016). 
185 Id. § 1508.4. 
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succeeded, in significant part, because environmental plaintiffs have limited resources and are 
constrained by countervailing political considerations. These realities strictly limit environmental 
groups to filing cases with compelling facts or the potential to set valuable precedent for NEPA 
procedures beyond the specifics of the particular case.  
B. The Interplay of Presidential Politics and Judicial Ideology 
Our most important findings expose the mechanisms by which structural elements of the 
federal judiciary mediate the influence of partisan politics on judicial review across presidential 
administrations. They also provide a consistent explanation for why judicial ideology is a 
significant independent factor at the district court level, whereas its influence is more complex at 
the appellate level. Our principal conclusions are twofold: (1) the alignment or misalignment of 
presidential politics with a statute’s mandate has a substantial impact on the stringency of 
judicial review; and (2) the number of cases in a circuit, the balance of conservative and liberal 
ideologies among appellate judges on a circuit, and the statistics of appellate panels can heighten 
or moderate the influence of ideology at the appellate level. To our knowledge, this is the first 
time that the influence of presidential politics and these types of circuit effects have been 
documented. 
We observe two striking patterns in case outcomes across the Bush and Obama 
Administrations. First, plaintiffs prevailed at much higher rates during the Bush Administration 
than the Obama Administration at both the district court (39 versus 20 percent, respectively) and 
appellate levels (28 versus 16 percent, respectively). Second, the influence of judicial ideology 
was much greater during the Bush Administration. This is clearly evident in the district court and 
appellate data, but the degree of convergence was more dramatic at the appellate level. The 
difference in plaintiff success rates between Democratic- and Republican-appointed district 
judges declined from 17 to 10 percent across the two administrations versus, at the appellate 
level, a drop from 20 to 2 percent between majority Democratic- and majority Republican-
appointed panels across the two administrations.186 Importantly, this change cannot be attributed 
to variation in plaintiffs filing cases, as this convergence is not observed in the subsets of cases 
with exclusively either environmental or non-environmental plaintiffs.187 Both of these changes, 
one absolute and the other relative, highlight the influence of presidential politics and circuit 
effects on judicial review. The latter relative change is of particular importance, however, 
because it exposes changes in judicial deference across the two administrations that cannot be 
explained by differences in the characteristics of the cases.188 
                                                 
186 During the Bush Administration, the difference in plaintiff success rates between Democrat- and Republican-
appointed district judges was 17 percent (48 and 31 percent, respectively) versus 10 percent (24 and 14 percent, 
respectively) during the Obama Administration. At the appellate level, during the Bush Administration the 
difference in plaintiff success rates between majority Democrat- and majority Republican-appointed panels was 20 
percent (38 and 17 percent, respectively) versus 2 percent (17 and 15 percent, respectively) during the Obama 
Administration. 
187 In the case of the environmental plaintiffs, the split between Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in 
rates at which plaintiffs prevailed remained static at 13 percent, whereas for non-environmental plaintiffs it 
remained static at roughly 6 percent. 
188 If only the population of cases were changing, the success rates of plaintiffs might change but this alone could 
not affect differences based on judicial ideology. 
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Despite the dramatic shifts in case outcomes across administrations, the influence of the 
presidential administration is not a statistically significant factor at the appellate level, unlike the 
district court sampler. We believe the explanation for this result centers on the alignment of the 
statutory mandate of NEPA with the politics of the presidential administration and the 
ideological commitments of the judge(s) hearing each case. As one of the leading federal 
environmental statutes, NEPA is closely associated with liberal Democratic goals, which in the 
current era of political polarization conflict with conservative Republican orthodoxy. The liberal 
policies of NEPA processes create the potential for judicial ideology to be split between, neutral 
towards, or in alignment with the party politics of the administration in power and the statutory 
mandate of NEPA.  
It is easiest to understand this dynamic through four basic scenarios reflected in our data, 
namely, cases filed during each administration with either Democratic- or Republican-appointed 
judges. Starting with the Bush Administration, Republican judges were sympathetic to the 
Administration and unsympathetic to the liberal goals of NEPA (both factors aligning against 
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges were sympathetic to the goals of NEPA 
but unsympathetic to the Administration (both factors aligning in favor of environmental 
plaintiffs). By contrast during the Obama administration, Republican judges were unsympathetic 
to NEPA’s goals and to the Administration (both factors essentially neutral towards 
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges were sympathetic to both (one factor 
favoring and the other opposing environmental plaintiffs). As a consequence, the ideological 
commitments of the judges are either split between the parties or neutral towards them, which 
diminishes the influence of judicial ideology. 
These four scenarios apply to district court judges who hear cases on their own but they 
do not reflect the more complex interactions between judges that occur on appellate panels. 
Individually, we expect ideological alignment to have a similar impact on circuit judges but our 
regression in Table 3 indicates that the direct influence of ideology is obscured when judges hear 
cases as three-judge panels. The ideological makeup of circuit panels alone was not statistically 
significant in our regressions, and yet we observe a dramatic convergence in the rates at which 
plaintiffs prevailed between panels with majority Democratic- and majority Republican-
appointed judges during the Obama Administration. We infer from this that the interplay 
between presidential politics and judicial ideology in appeals is statistically significant only 
when case outcomes are aggregated at the Circuit level.  
This observation raises the question of what circuit-level attributes mediate the interplay 
of presidential politics and judicial ideology. We believe that three mutually reinforcing factors 
are important—all of which center on the Ninth Circuit, which is both an “outlier” relative to 
other circuits and a dominant venue in its own right. Two of the factors are straightforward, 
namely, the large number of NEPA cases filed in the Ninth Circuit and the roughly 60- to 40-
percent split between Democratic- and Republican-appointed appellate judges in the Circuit. The 
third factor concerns the combinatorics of three-judge panels and how it amplifies the impact of 
the first two factors. In essence, because most circuits have very few NEPA appeals and 
ideologically uniform panels are relatively rare (about 12 percent of the cases), the Ninth Circuit 
for statistical reasons alone should account for roughly half of the all-Democratic-appointee 
panels. Add to this the skew of the Ninth Circuit towards Democratic-appointed judges and it is 
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unsurprising that the Ninth Circuit accounted for 83 percent of the appellate panels nationally 
with exclusively Democratic-appointed judges.  
These three factors generate significant circuit-level effects in the Ninth Circuit for two 
reasons. First, ideologically homogeneous panels, as reflected in our data and other studies, tend 
to be most influenced by ideology because each judge’s predilections are reinforced rather than 
tempered by their colleagues.189 Second, there may be strength in numbers at the circuit level 
that gives judges in the majority greater sway on panels, which we find evidence for in the 
relatively high success rates of environmental plaintiffs before ideologically mixed panels in the 
Ninth Circuit. Structural, circuit-level reasons therefore exist for judicial ideology to have an 
outsized influence on the outcomes of appellate cases in the Ninth Circuit that do not apply to 
other circuits. Further, we expect this ideological bias to filter down to district court judges 
through precedent and their risk aversion to being overturned on appeal. This inference is 
consistent with the relatively high success rates of plaintiffs at the district court level in the Ninth 
Circuit, which cannot be attributed to the ideology of individual judges because, unlike the 
appellate judges, they are evenly split between Democratic and Republican appointees.  
The significance of the higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs and defendant 
appellees is more difficult to reduce to a simple explanation. We cannot rule out a combination 
of selection effects, ideological alignment, or superior litigation strategy. It could be that 
environmental organizations are better at selecting cases and litigating them, or perhaps because 
the interests of environmentalists naturally align with NEPA’s statutory mandate, judges tend to 
favor them. We do not find any clear signals in the data—for example, one might expect local 
environmental organizations to be less sophisticated in selecting and litigating cases, but we do 
not observe any consistent evidence of this pattern in case outcomes. Similarly, the much higher 
rates of success on appeal for defendant appellees is difficult to interpret due to the powerful 
selection effects (meaning a very high bar to filing an appeal), and competing doctrines 
regarding judicial deference to lower courts and the defendant agency. We suspect that both are 
at play but, particularly given the small number of such cases in our sample, we must be 
circumspect in the inferences that we draw. 
The interaction we observe between presidential politics and judicial ideology at the 
district court level is likely to apply beyond NEPA. However, empirical studies of judicial 
review under other statutes, particularly those aligned ideologically with Republican politics, 
must be conducted to substantiate this inference. The circuit-level effects we observe at the 
appellate level are conditional—the degree to which they occur will depend on the distribution of 
cases across circuits and the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in each 
circuit. Litigation under NEPA, fortuitously, provides a context in which circuit-level effects 
were magnified by the disproportionate share of cases and the substantial majority of 
                                                 
189 The statistics for the four combinations of judges on an appellate panel are as follows: (1) all cases in the sample 
– plaintiffs prevailed on at least one claim in 8% of the cases before an all Republican panel, 17% before a panel of 
two Republicans and 1 Democrat, 26% before two Democrats and one Republican, and 39% before an all Democrat 
panel; (2) Bush Administration – plaintiffs prevailed on at least one claim in 5% of the cases before an all 
Republican panel, 20% before a panel of two Republicans and 1 Democrat, 42% before two Democrats and one 
Republican, and 41% before an all Democrat panel; (3) Obama Administration – plaintiffs prevailed on at least one 
claim in 12% of the cases before an all Republican panel, 13% before a panel of two Republicans and 1 Democrat, 
9% before two Democrats and one Republican, and 36% before an all Democrat panel. 
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Democratic-appointed appellate judges in the Ninth Circuit. For example, while we would expect 
to observe similar results for other natural resource statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act 
and the National Forest Management Act, the necessary preconditions may or may not exist for 
other environmental laws or statutes in other areas of law. This study demonstrates that circuit-
level effects can significantly impact case outcomes and should be factored into our 
understanding of how the circuit structure of the judiciary and the ideological balance of judges 
within circuits affect judicial review of agency action.  
The interplay of presidential politics and judicial ideology we observe suggests several 
subsidiary inferences. First, the influence of judicial ideology on district court cases will be 
greater when the mandate of a statute is misaligned with the politics of the presidential 
administration, but the degree to which judicial review provides a valid check on executive 
action will turn on the number of judges with ideological commitments in alignment with the 
mandate of the governing statute. Second, the circuit-level effects we observe will be greatest 
when one or a small number of circuits account for a disproportionate share of the cases litigated 
under a statute. Whether this set of conditions skews outcomes in a liberal or conservative 
direction, and how far, will depend on the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed 
appellate judges on the circuit(s). Conversely, if cases are distributed relatively uniformly across 
circuits, perhaps due to geographic factors or the absence of forum shopping, circuit-level effects 
will be weak or disappear. These insights also provide new grounds for understanding the special 
status of the Ninth Circuit. Our findings suggest that the Ninth Circuit cannot be reduced to the 
ideological balance of its judges or its size; geographic and other factors that determine the 
distribution of cases across circuits and the structure of appellate panels are of equal importance.  
 
From a normative perspective, our data reveal that judicial ideology is not bad per se. To 
the contrary, it has the potential to play a valuable role in checking executive branch actions 
when presidential politics are misaligned with statutory mandates. The degree to which this 
occurs will depend on the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed district judges 
hearing the cases, as well as the alignment of their ideological commitments with the statutory 
mandate at issue. In addition, the circuit-level effects we observed in the Ninth Circuit (driven by 
the number of cases in the Circuit) can enhance the effective stringency of judicial review at the 
appellate level. We have described the basic phenomena but it would be useful to model 
systematically how it is likely to vary with the number of circuits in the federal system and their 
relative size, both geographically and with respect to numbers of cases. The importance of these 
factors also exposes the structural contingencies of judicial oversight and how they mediate the 
influence of judicial ideology in administrative cases. In doing so, it enhances our understanding 
of the institutional frameworks and political forces that shape the effectiveness of the checks and 
balances provided by an independent judiciary.  
C. The Asymmetries of Environmental and Economic Review Statutes  
NEPA has served as a model for economic regulatory review statutes and executive 
orders premised on ensuring that the relationship between the economic costs and benefits of 
regulations is adequately considered.190 The politics surrounding the economics of regulation 
have escalated under the Trump Administration and current Congress, which together are taking 
                                                 
190 See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 14, at 381-82. 
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regulatory reform to an extreme. The Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA), pending legislation 
which has bipartisan support in Congress, exemplifies this trend. It incorporates an array of 
procedures for conducting economic analyses and provides broad rights of administrative and 
judicial review.191 Substantively, if the bill were adopted, agencies would have to ensure that, 
with limited exceptions, they adopt “the most cost-effective rule that . . . meets relevant statutory 
objectives.”192 Further, while the applicability of existing laws mandating economic impact 
analyses is limited to “significant” or “major” rules,193 the RAA contains provisions that 
implicate a far wider range of regulations.194   
This new generation of regulatory review laws will prolong the six to eight years it 
typically takes to complete a rulemaking,195 a process that can take much longer if a rule is 
controversial.196 Although numerous factors contribute to the duration of rulemaking 
processes,197 augmented economic review procedures are widely cited as a major contributing 
                                                 
191 S. 951, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(f))). For example, the RAA affords 
“interested persons” the right to petition an agency to hold a formal hearing on high-impact rules if “the proposed 
rule is based on conclusions with respect to 1 or more specific scientific, technical, economic, or other complex 
factual issues that are genuinely disputed” that would be likely to affect the costs and benefits of the rule or whether 
it would achieve statutory purposes. Id. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(B)(i)).  
192 Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(f)(1)(A)). Although many existing impact analysis requirements are purely 
procedural, some important ones are not. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (requiring 
agencies to “select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objective or 
the rule”); Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(5), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), supplemented by Exec. Order No. 
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (agencies must design regulations “in the most cost-effective manner to 
achieve the regulatory objective”);. 
193 Major rules are typically defined as those expected to generate expenditures or have an impact of $100 million or 
more each year on the economy. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 6(a)(3)(C), 3(f); 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012). 
194 The bill encompasses regulations that are likely to cause “significant adverse effects on competition, 
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, public health and safety, or the ability of United States-based 
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.” S. 951, § 2(5) (to be codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 551(18)(C)) (major rules). Other existing economic assessment requirements are similarly subject to 
multiple triggers. Executive Order 12,866’s definition of a “significant regulatory action,” for example, includes 
rules that “[c]reate a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another 
agency,” “[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan program or the rights and 
obligations of recipients thereof,” or raise novel legal or policy questions arising out of legal mandates, presidential 
priorities or the Order’s priorities. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f). See also Congressional Research Serv., Counting 
Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register, 
R43056, at 8 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf; 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2012) (the RFA applies to every 
rule subject to notice and comment rulemaking); 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d) (2012) (the PRA applies to requirements to 
collect information contained in a proposed and final rule); 44 U.S.C. § 351(2012) (the Information Quality Act 
(IQA) applies to “information disseminated by Federal agencies”). 
195 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1496 (2012). 
196 See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking 
Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464 (2012) (arguing that as a result of rulemaking 
ossification, “important and controversial rules usually take five or more years to make and sometimes even a 
decade or longer”); Royal C. Gardner, Public Participation and Wetlands Regulation, 10 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 6 n.28 (1991) (“Some informal rulemakings can take up to ten years to complete.”). 
197 See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 109 (2015) (highlighting 
“four problems: 1) analytic requirements imposed by Congress . . .; 2) analytic requirements imposed by the White 
House; 3) congressional review; and 4) judicial review.”). 
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factor.198 The pending RAA contains provisions that appear to be specifically designed to burden 
rulemaking processes further by, for example, affording “interested persons” the right to petition 
an agency to hold a formal “public hearing” that includes lengthy witness testimony and cross-
examination199 for high-impact rules.200 These provisions would not only add procedures widely 
viewed as unnecessary and counterproductive; they would also establish broad criteria for 
triggering cumbersome hearing procedures. Essentially, any issue implicating genuinely disputed 
complex factual questions that could affect a rule’s costs and benefits or whether it achieves the 
applicable statutory purposes could be grounds requiring an agency to grant a petition for a 
formal public hearing.201  
Beyond the addition of more elaborate and formal processes, these economic review laws 
differ from NEPA in other ways. NEPA procedures differ from the new regulatory review laws 
by incorporating flexible frameworks that afford agencies broad discretion to determine the level 
of environmental review required; as we have seen, the scope of NEPA analyses vary widely and 
most entail abridged assessments under CEs and EAs rather than full-blown EISs. Neither the 
executive orders nor the existing economic review legislation contain frameworks for 
abbreviated assessments analogous to NEPA’s CEs or EAs, such as a mechanism analogous to 
NEPA’s mitigated FONSI that allows an agency to soften the economic impact to avoid rigorous 
impact analysis requirements. Under the RFA, for example, regulatory flexibility analyses follow 
one-size-fits-all procedures and criteria,202 and the same is true of the cost-benefit analyses under 
the key executive orders203 and other existing statutes.204 The pending RAA adopts a similar 
approach but with far more extensive procedures. Without the tailoring mechanisms that have 
evolved under NEPA, economic review laws are far more likely to increase the costs and 
duration of agency rulemaking, and ample evidence exists that they already do205 and that 
statutes such as the RAA will exacerbate these problems.206 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 
1404-05 (1992); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process-for Better or Worse, 34 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469, 473-76 (2008) (attributing rulemaking ossification in part to the enactment of legislation 
imposing “new analytical requirements modeled on” the EIS process under NEPA and to similar requirements 
imposed by executive orders such as Executive Order 12,866); but cf. Raso, supra note 197, at 110 (arguing that 
“the RFA and UMRA are unlikely to contribute to ossification because agencies avoid these requirements quite 
frequently and because these statutes do not seem to delay rulemaking”). 
199 S. 951, 115th Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(3)(B)(iii)(III)). 
200 Id. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(1)(A), (C)(i)). 
201 Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(B)(i)) (high-impact rules). The bill is more accommodating for major 
rules. The grounds for denial of a public hearing for a major rule would be a reasonable determination by the agency 
that a hearing would not advance consideration of the proposed rule by the agency, or would unreasonably delay 
completion of the rulemaking. Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(1)(C)(ii)). 
202 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-609. The Act allows agencies to avoid preparing a regulatory flexibility analysis if an agency 
head certifies that a rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Id. § 
605(b). 
203 E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C). The Order does allow for truncated procedures “[i]n emergency 
situations or when an agency is obligated by law to act more quickly than normal review procedures allow.” Id. § 
6(a)(3)(D). 
204 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1536 (2012). 
205 See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
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This flexibility is of particular importance because NEPA has taken on a “quasi-
constitutional status”207 that some commentators have likened to a “super statute” because its 
institutional and normative principles have become so broadly influential.208 In the present 
context, this status is important because judges are more likely to construe and apply NEPA in a 
manner that limits agency discretion when it has the potential to subvert NEPA’s goals.209 Since 
NEPA’s passage, courts have demonstrated a distinctive willingness to intervene when agencies 
give NEPA procedures short shrift.210 Over time the RAA, and other economic review statutes, 
have the potential to be viewed as similarly foundational, much as they already do with the APA, 
and this posture could lead courts to subject agency compliance to a heightened level of scrutiny 
that would limit agency discretion and further encourage challenges to agency rules. In addition, 
while the RAA and other regulatory impact statutes contain substantive provisions, this elevated 
status could erode the greater deference judges afford substantive agency decisions.211  
To date, the added costs and delays associated with legal challenges to agency 
compliance with economic review statutes212 and executive orders213 have been largely avoided 
                                                 
207 Karkkainen, supra note 31, at 333-34 (claiming that the duty to prepare an EIS “is as fundamental to 
contemporary administrative practice as an agency’s duty under the APA to provide notice and opportunity for 
public comment prior to issuing rules”); Merrill, supra note 7, at 1039-40 (characterizing NEPA and the APA as 
“framework” statutes whose “rather spare” provisions have generated a “common law of administrative procedure”); 
Metzger, supra  note 7, at 479. 
208 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) (citing the 
Endangered Species Act, which is closely analogous to NEPA in many respects, as an example of a super-statute). 
209 Cf. Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of 
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 718 (1977) (making this 
point with respect to the Clean Air Act). 
210 Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (in a now 
famous passage, applying NEPA so that “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not 
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy”). Then-Professor Scalia derided this conception 
of NEPA. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983) (calling the loss or misdirection of statutory law “a good thing”). 
211 See Stark & Wald, supra note 14, at 361 (claiming that courts in administrative law cases tend to enforce 
procedural mandates more strongly than substantive requirements); DeLong, supra note 14, at 417 (“The courts are 
most comfortable when assessing the procedural regularity of agency action.”); Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate 
Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 323 (1974) (“Courts feel more comfortable 
placing procedural, rather than substantive, limitations on legislatively authorized programs.”); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 
MD. L. REV. 466, 467 n.9 (1983) (“’Substance’ and ‘procedure’ are inevitably overlapping terms, and . . . the courts 
are more comfortable dealing with the latter.”). 
212 2 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2012) (UMRA provision precluding judicial review of the content in assessments detailing 
regulatory impacts on state and local government); 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2012) (RFA provision authorizing judicial 
review of alleged noncompliance with some of its provisions but not others); Dithiocarbamate Task Force v. EPA, 
98 F.3d 1394, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that courts are limited to precluding an agency from enforcing a rule 
issued in violation of the PRA). Courts addressing the justiciability of challenges to IQA compliance have mostly 
refused to address the merits. See, e.g., Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding no standing to 
pursue IQA challenge and noting that the IQA does not create a legal right to have agencies rely on accurate 
information); In re Operation of the Missouri River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1174-75 (D. Minn. 2004), 
aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005) (review is unavailable because IQA 
requirements are committed to agency discretion by law for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). 
213 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 7(d), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (stating that the Order does not 
create any substantive or procedural rights enforceable at law against the United States or its agents); Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, § 10, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (same). 
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because they either preclude or strictly limit judicial review.214 The RAA, however, departs from 
the narrow grants of judicial review found in existing regulatory review laws. It gives litigants 
the right to challenge the scope and substance of an economic impact statement,215 as well as 
other specific procedural requirements,216 and similar to NEPA,217 courts would have the 
authority to remand a rule back to the agency to cure procedural or substantive defects.218 The 
RAA therefore would make judicial challenges freely available to an unprecedented degree. 
Together the structural differences between NEPA and the economic review laws raise 
the specter that the conditions responsible for facilitating efficient compliance with NEPA and 
constraining litigation will be eroded or absent, creating both legal and practical concerns. First, 
as described above, NEPA is calibrated in a way that the RAA and other statutes are not. 
Whereas NEPA has three tiers of environmental reviews, existing and proposed economic 
review laws have a single tier that encompasses a broad range of federal actions.219 In addition, 
while practical or strategic considerations limit challenges to invocation of a CE or reliance on 
an EA for small-scale projects under NEPA, this is not necessarily true of regulatory reviews. In 
particular, because economic reviews often center on impacts concentrated on regulated entities, 
as opposed to the diffuse public benefits associated with environmental measures that may result 
from NEPA compliance, the economic stakes are much more likely to justify incurring the high 
costs of a judicial challenge. 
Second, the resources of the industry litigants most likely to file legal challenges under 
statutes like the RAA are vastly greater than those of the environmental organizations that 
dominate litigation under NEPA. Large regulated entities subject to major regulations will also 
have powerful profit-based incentives to challenge major regulations, even if only to delay their 
effective date. Similarly, although small businesses are less likely to have the resources to file 
suits on a routine basis, they can spread costs through suits by other businesses that may benefit 
them or rely on trade associations or entities like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce with sufficient 
resources to file lawsuits. In either case, whether by virtue of individual scale or collective 
pooling, the economic constraints on filing legal challenges under economic review laws are 
dramatically less than those for NEPA. 
Third, if the courts follow the lead of the Supreme Court in the Clean Power Plan (CPP) 
litigation by liberally granting injunctive relief at an early stage of litigation, the economic and 
                                                 
214 Even when direct review of augmented procedures is not available, however, the documents they generate 
become part of the rulemaking record and may be used to argue that agency action is substantively arbitrary and 
capricious. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 611(b), (d) (2012) (RFA); 2 U.S.C. § 1571(a)(4) (UMRA). 
215 S. 951, § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(l) (7)(A)(ii)). 
216 Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(l)(7)(A)(i)) (granting the right to challenge an agency’s failure to publish the 
framework for assessment of a major or a high-impact rule). 
217 In at least one respect, judicial review of procedural compliance under the RAA would be narrower than under 
NEPA. Review of an agency’s determination of whether a rule is a major rule that is subject to impact analysis 
requirements and that may require a public hearing would be unavailable. Id. § 4(3) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 
706(c)). 
218 Id. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(l)(7)(B)). 
219 The PRA, for example, applies to requirements to collect information contained in a proposed and final rule. 44 
U.S.C. § 3507(d) (2012). The IQA applies to “information disseminated by Federal agencies.” Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
§ 515(b) (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note). 
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strategic incentives for bringing challenges under the RAA will be enhanced. The Court in that 
case stayed EPA’s regulations restricting greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants 
before any lower court had the opportunity to address the merits, and it did so without 
explanation.220 By contrast, the Court has sent a clear signal that lower courts have been too 
lenient in granting injunctions under NEPA and admonished them to ratchet up the showing 
needed to demonstrate irreparable injury.221 Predictably, the CPP stay has prompted regulated 
entities to seek stays of other Clean Air Act regulations while litigation is pending. If that 
strategy succeeds, it would only be a matter of time before economic interests make similar 
arguments under a statute like the RAA. 
Fourth, the interplay of presidential politics and the mandates of regulatory review laws 
will be a major factor in determining the effective stringency of judicial oversight and the impact 
of litigation. The requirements for economic assessments found in regulatory reform statutes 
reflect a largely partisan Republican ideology, suggesting that judicial review of agency 
compliance will be most common, and potentially disruptive, during Democratic administrations 
that believe government regulation serves important objectives even if it has significant 
economic impacts in the regulated sectors. Under such circumstances, when tensions exist 
between statutory goals and presidential priorities, the framework from Part III.B. predicts that 
judicial ideology will have a substantially greater impact on the outcome of legal challenges. 
However, as we have shown, the degree to which judicial ideology is a factor will depend on the 
distribution of cases across circuits and the ideological balance within them.  
In the case of the economic review laws, different factors could moderate or escalate the 
influence of judicial ideology. A potentially moderating factor is the broad range of rules and 
agency decisions likely to be subject to legal challenge under statutes like the RAA. Economic 
impacts are both more generic and less geographically bounded than environmental ones, and 
important classes of environmental regulations exempted from NEPA, such as Clean Air Act 
regulations, will be high-profile targets under economic review laws. This lack of constraints has 
the potential to distribute cases across a broader range of circuits than the handful that have 
dominated under NEPA. That distribution would tend to mitigate the influence of judicial 
ideology because nationally Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges are evenly balanced. 
On the other hand, if the absence of constraints liberates plaintiffs to forum shop, it could 
concentrate cases in the most conservative circuits. Thus, while the enhanced influence of liberal 
judicial ideology in NEPA litigation was driven by the geographic overlap of federal public lands 
and endangered species issues in the Ninth Circuit, the degree to which judicial ideology plays a 
role in the implementation of economic review laws is likely to be much more within the control 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
The sources of concern noted above—the binary nature of regulatory reviews laws, the 
incentives and far greater resources of business plaintiffs, and the recent move towards granting 
strategically valuable early injunctive relief to regulated entities—along with a long history of 
industry opposition to government regulation all suggest that business interests will use litigation 
aggressively. They also highlight the contingencies and precariousness of judicial ideology 
                                                 
220 Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 998 (2016). For discussion of the unprecedented nature of the stay 
decision, see Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 425 
(2016). 
221 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
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playing a constructive role in judicial review of agency action. Reasonable people will differ 
over whether the stringency of judicial oversight of the Bush Administration’s compliance with 
NEPA was appropriate, or even whether the relatively non-ideological level of judicial review 
during the Obama Administration represents an appropriate benchmark. Our understanding of 
the policies during both administrations leads us to believe that the disparities in judicial 
oversight are justifiable and provide an example of judicial ideology playing a constructive role, 
but we recognize that this view cannot be separated from a variety of normative judgments about 
the role and importance of NEPA.  
We nevertheless believe that there are important structural constraints on environmental 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs generally who represent diffuse public interests, that limit recourse to the 
courts and the impact of judicial ideology on agency action. These resource and institutional 
constraints force such plaintiffs to be more selective in the cases they file, making it more likely 
for their claims to align with the purposes and requirements of the law, and reduce the potential 
for judicial overreach simply by virtue of the modest numbers of cases filed. However, both of 
these constraints are relaxed when the plaintiffs are regulated entities challenging regulations that 
impose substantial costs on them. This dynamic, along with the much greater potential for forum 
shopping under the new generation of economic review laws, expose the stark asymmetries 
between them and NEPA. In short, the combination of legal and practical constraints that have 
mediated judicial review under NEPA will be either eroded or absent under regulatory review 
statutes such as the RAA. It is no small irony that the objections critics have leveled against 
NEPA—wasteful and costly delays in government actions driven by parochial interests—are far 
more likely to occur under the economic review statutes they are advocating.222 We hope that 
legal commentators and legislators across the political spectrum will appreciate that these 
statutes pose not only a threat to agency decisionmaking, but also to the legitimacy of judicial 
oversight because it has a much greater potential to exploit and exacerbate the influence of 
judicial ideology.  
                                                 
222 At the same time that the Trump Administration and Republican congressional majorities have championed 
enhanced economic impact review requirements, they have supported narrowing the scope of NEPA mandates or 
exempting activities such as infrastructure development production from NEPA altogether. See, e.g.. Exec. Order 
No. 13,766, Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure Projects, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 13,766 (Jan. 24, 2017); H.R. 1654, Water Supply Permitting Coordination Act, § 4(b)(4), 115 th Cong. (2017-
2018) (mandating expedited NEPA review of proposed water storage projects); see also Nationwide Conservative 
Groups: Promote Fiscal Responsibility in Upcoming Transportation and Infrastructure Spending (May 11, 2017), 
https://v6mx3476r2b25580w4eit4uv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Transpo_Coalition_FINAL.pdf (letter to members of Congress from conservative 
organizations criticizing “[l]engthy and often duplicative environmental impact studies [that] increase project costs 
and drag project timelines,” and suggesting reforms such as “the removal of greenhouse gas emissions from the 
review process and limiting the scope and application of [NEPA] as well as other planning and analysis mandates” 
to “save 
time and reallocate limited tax dollars from paperwork and red tape to asphalt and concrete”). President Trump has 
pledged to create an office within CEQ to speed infrastructure projects by eliminating “outdated federal rules” such 
as the permitting processes that slowed approval of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines. See Camille von 
Kaenel, Trump decries ‘painful’ permitting, bulky enviro reviews, GREENWIRE, June 9, 2017, 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060055833. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 Our study of district and appellate court NEPA decisions demonstrates that, contrary to 
the assessments of NEPA’s critics, the statute’s procedural requirements rarely delay policies or 
projects. Judicial review is also found to be calibrated, such that the influence of judicial 
ideology, and the degree of scrutiny, varies with the ideological alignment of presidential politics 
and the statutory mandate under review. This dynamic is mediated by the distribution of cases 
across circuits and the ideological balance of judges within them; at base, it is driven by 
rudimentary statistics that determine the number of ideologically homogeneous appellate panels 
in a circuit. We find that, under a well-defined range of conditions, judicial ideology can play a 
constructive role in ensuring that agencies comply with statutory mandates and judicial checks 
can be most robust precisely when the risk of statutory subversion is greatest—that is when the 
ideology of the administration is in tension with a statutory mandate. 
 
A comparison of NEPA with the expanding array of legal mandates that prescribe 
elaborate economic impact analyses illustrate the normative and practical implications of these 
observations. The raft of executive orders issued by the Trump Administration and new 
legislation pending in Congress have elevated the importance and potential impacts on agency 
decisionmaking of augmented economic reviews. The interplay we identify between presidential 
politics and judicial review provides new grounds for concern that, unlike NEPA, these policies 
have a much greater potential to disrupt and delay agency decisionmaking processes. Further 
empirical study of judicial review under a range of statutes is needed to determine how broadly 
these findings apply to administrative review challenges in general. 
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Appendix: Description of Empirical Methods and Protocols 
From an empirical standpoint, collecting data on NEPA cases is facilitated by their 
procedural simplicity. NEPA cases follow a foreshortened series of steps—transmittal of the 
administrative record to the court; filing of cross motions for injunctive relief, dismissal, or 
summary judgment. While settlement, abandonment, or a procedural defect may shortcut the 
process and minor variations in procedural timelines may occur (e.g., motions to stay cases 
pending external events), most NEPA cases are resolved on motions for summary judgment. 
Further, because administrative challenges are based largely, and typically exclusively, on 
administrative records, district court proceedings are not burdened by drawn-out discovery 
battles. A judge’s primary task is to evaluate the administrative record from the federal agency, 
the relevant legal authorities, and the arguments of the parties to determine whether to affirm or 
reverse the agency, in whole or part, and where a defect is found to grant injunctive relief or 
remand the case to the federal agency for further consideration.  
These procedural virtues are complemented by the relative simplicity and linguistic 
idiosyncrasies of NEPA claims. In particular, the distinctive legal terms associated with NEPA 
claims enable automated coding of cases and facilitate hand coding with few potential sources of 
ambiguity. Together, these characteristics make NEPA litigation a particularly attractive subject 
for empirical study.  
A. NEPA Litigation Study Design and Methods 
We adopted a two-part strategy for determining how we would code the cases.223 First, 
we coded a sample of about 200 district court cases at a high level of granularity (data on 
roughly 60 claims and subclaims were collected) to gain a rough assessment of the key variables 
and to determine which claims had the potential to generate meaningful statistics. As a 
complement to this sample, we used the NVivo software to auto code about 1,580 district court 
and 585 circuit court opinions224 drawn from the Westlaw federal courts database that referred to 
NEPA from 2001 through 2015.225 This coding evaluated the frequency of specialized legal 
terms used in NEPA claims and thus provided a complementary measure of the rates at which 
specific NEPA claims were raised.226 We also conducted numerous Chi2 and regression analyses 
                                                 
223 Our data collection followed the principles of study design in the ICPSR Guide to Social Science Data 
Preparation and Archiving (5th ed., 2012) and the recommendations of recent legal scholarship. See Pauline T. Kim 
et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 J. LAW & POL. 83, 83-84 (2009).  
224 For both the district court and circuit court cases, we compiled a large database of cases using the search-term 
phrase “National Environmental Policy Act” in the Westlaw “Federal Cases” database. This generated 1,967 district 
cases and 842 circuit court cases. From these cases, we culled cases in which at least one substantive NEPA claim 
was raised (e.g., a challenge to a categorical exclusion or to the alternatives in environmental assessment); this 
second round of coding generated the 1,579 district court and 584 circuit court cases. Random samples were then 
taken for each database for use in hand coding of cases. 
225 We used the Westlaw database for All Federal Cases. Cases were selected based on whether they included the 
phrase “National Environmental Policy Act.” This was purposefully over-inclusive and cases were subsequently 
culled based on more precise studies of their content. There is an apparent lag in the time that its takes district court 
cases to be added to the Westlaw database, which is evident in the low numbers of cases for 2015 and particularly 
2016. 
226 In a subset of these cases, we were able to use the automated coding to determine whether the plaintiff or federal 
defendants prevailed. These cases provided a very efficient means of assessing the relative success of different types 
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to determine which variables would be included in the larger study. Together, this preliminary 
work enabled us to identify ten variables for which data would be collected in the larger sample 
of 498 district court cases and 334 circuit court cases.  
The sample data included information on the court and judge, parties to the litigation, the 
nature of the federal action, jurisdictional challenges, substantive challenges under NEPA, and 
the timing of a case. The list below provides a general description of the range of data collected: 
 Court, judge, presidential administration (and party) that appointed the judge 
 Identity of parties to the litigation, classes of litigants (e.g., environmental 
organization, individual, government, business) 
 Dates of court filings, motions, and opinions and duration of the litigation 
 Lead federal agency, other federal agencies (if any) involved in the NEPA process 
and type of federal action (e.g., federal permit, funding, or direction action) 
 NEPA claims raised (e.g., adequacy of an environmental assessment), and 
disposition of claims (e.g., dismissal, settlement, decision on the merits) 
 Nature of the relief (if any) provided by the court to successful plaintiffs (e.g. 
remand to agency, preliminary or permanent injunction) 
The study data were drawn from three separate sources: (1) the federal judiciary’s 
“Public Access to Court Electronic Records” (PACER) database, which contains case docket 
information and court filings dating back to roughly 2000;227 (2) the Westlaw database of 
published and unpublished federal court opinions;228 and (3) the Attributes of U.S. Federal 
Judges Database compiled under the Judicial Research Initiative at the University of South 
Carolina.229 In addition, we obtained a database from the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) with partially coded NEPA cases for the periods 2000-2009 and 2012-2014.230 The CEQ 
data were particularly valuable because they contain cases settled or dismissed prior to a court 
decision on the merits; without this case information, it would have been exceedingly difficult to 
identify such cases given the limitations of the PACER and Westlaw databases. Unfortunately, 
because of inconsistencies in the case-coding methods, we ultimately did not use this database.  
Use of several databases was essential because it enabled us to collect a large sample of 
unpublished opinions, which numerous studies have shown can differ from published decisions 
                                                 
of NEPA claims, but this analysis is incomplete because it presumes (incorrectly) that all NEPA claims rise and fall 
together. Because of this, any associations observed are likely to be real, but the absence of such associations does 
not imply that none exist—as the lumping of claims together will obscure such associations. 
227 The PACER database is available at https://www.pacer.gov/.  
228 The Westlaw database for federal cases and opinions (All Federal Cases) is available at 
https://lawschool.westlaw.com/.  
229 The Judicial Research Initiative is available at http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm; we also 
obtained information from the federal Judiciary site available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html. 
230 The data were obtained through Horst Greczmeil, the Associate Director for NEPA Oversight at CEQ, which 
oversees an annual NEPA litigation survey (available through https://ceq.doe.gov/legal_corner/litigation.html and 
http://energy.gov/nepa/downloads/nepa-litigation-surveys).  
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in systematic ways.231 Researchers have found, for example, that published district court 
opinions are generally more “liberal” than unpublished ones, and that ideological influences are 
greater in the former compared with the latter.232 The low rates at which judges actually rule on 
cases filed in district courts exacerbate these selection biases. In 2006, for example, less than half 
of the cases filed in district courts were resolved by some form of adjudication, with most of the 
remaining cases either being abandoned or settled.233 Moreover, given that cases are unlikely to 
settle randomly, fully litigated cases will not be representative of all the cases that are filed. The 
presence of these selection effects demonstrates that studies limited to evaluating district court 
opinions, especially if solely published opinions, will generate misleading or unrepresentative 
results. 
  
B. Descriptive Statistics for District and Circuit Court Cases 
 
Table 4: Relative Frequency of Procedural and Supplemental Claims 2000-2015234 
 
Categorical 
Exclusion 
Supplemental 
EIS 
Tiering Constitutional 
Standing 
Prudential 
Standing 
Ripeness Mootness Exhaustion 
Number 
of Cases 205 250 88 642 91 166 141 119 
Percent 
All Cases 13% 15.8% 5.6% 40.7% 5.8% 10.5% 8.9% 7.5% 
Median 2 3 2.5 3 2 2 3 2 
90th% 11 14.5 8 21 11 10 12 6 
 
 
  
                                                 
231 See Evan Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The 
Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7 (1999); Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished 
Opinions in the United States Court of Appeals, 3 J. APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROC. 199 (2001);  Denise M. 
Keele, An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 213 (2009); Peter Siegelman & John Donohue, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of 
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOC. REV. 1133 (1990); Stephen Wasby 
Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APPELLATE 
PRACTICE AND PROC. 325 (2001). 
232 Keele, supra note 231, at 213-14. 
233 Hoffman, supra note 140, at 682-82. 
234 Note that the mean, median, and 90th percentile refer to the actual number of times that the specific claim is 
referred in a case. For example, the 90th percentile indicates the number of times that the claim is references in this 
top tier of cases. These data are based on the database of 1579 cases we compiled from the Westlaw database, 640 of 
which are unpublished cases. 
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Table 5: Relative Frequency of Environmental Assessment Claims 2000-2015235 
 
Alternatives Cumulative 
Impacts 
Mitigation Indirect 
Impacts 
Uncertainty Intensity FONSI 
Number of 
Cases 
355 278 162 119 87 71 683 
Percent All 
Cases 
22.5% 17.6% 10.3% 7.5% 5.5% 4.5% 13.36% 
Percent of 
EA Claims 
47.84% 37.47% 21.83% 16.04% 11.73% 9.57% 92.05% 
Median 2 2.5 2 1 1 1 4 
90th% 9 10 6 4 3 2 19 
 
 
Table 6: Relative Frequency of Environmental Impact Statement Claims 2000-2015 
 
Alternatives Cumulative 
Impacts 
Mitigation Scope Indirect 
Impacts 
Uncertainty Connected Intensity 
Number of 
Cases 
587 398 247 173 160 147 138 111 
Percent  
All Cases 
37.2% 25.2% 15.6% 11.0% 10.1% 9.3% 8.74% 7.0% 
Percent of 
EIS Claims 
72.83% 49.38% 30.65% 21.46% 19.85% 18.24% 17.12% 13.77% 
Median 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
90th% 8 6 7 3 3 4 3 3 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
235 Claims based on “controversial actions” and “segmentation” were raised in less than 3 percent of the district 
court cases and less than 7 percent of the district court cases in which challenges to EAs were raised. 
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Table 7: Relative Frequency of Procedural and Supplemental Claims in Appeals236 
stats Categorical 
Exclusion 
Supplemental 
EIS 
Tiering Constitutional 
Standing 
Prudential 
Standing 
Ripeness Mootness Exhaustion 
Number 
of Cases 
47 93 30 219 30 56 57 35 
Percent 
All Cases 
8.05% 15.92% 5.14% 37.50% 5.14% 9.59% 9.76% 5.99% 
Median 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 1 
90th% 11 11 7 23 8 10 9 7 
 
 
Table 8: Relative Frequency of Environmental Assessment Claims in Appeals  
stats Alternatives Cumulative 
Impacts 
Mitigation Indirect 
Impacts 
Uncertainty Intensity FONSI 
Number of 
Cases 
73 67 38 24 23 19 210 
Percent 
All Cases 
12.50% 11.47% 6.51% 4.11% 3.94% 3.25% 35.96% 
Percent of 
EA Claims 
30.67% 28.15% 15.97% 10.08% 9.66% 7.98% 88.24% 
Median 2 2 2 1 1 1 4.5 
90th%  9 8 8 4 2 3 14 
 
 
Table 9: Relative Frequency of Environmental Impact Statement Claims in Appeals 
 
Alternatives Cumulative 
Impacts 
Mitigation Scope Indirect 
Impacts 
Uncertainty Intensity Connected 
Number of 
Cases 
208 117 86 79 41 53 33 32 
Percent All 
Cases 
35.62% 20.03% 14.73% 13.53% 7.02% 9.08% 5.65% 5.48% 
Percent of 
EIS Claims 
69.10% 38.87% 28.57% 26.25% 13.62% 
 
17.61% 10.96% 
 
10.63% 
Median 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 
90th% 9 7 7 4 2 3 2 10 
 
 
 
                                                 
236 For the 584 appellate cases, 301 involved EIS claims and 238 involved EA claims. 
